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A defendant whose lawyer fails to raise a federal claim at trial
in state court may sometimes, but not always, raise that claim on
collateral review. If the mechanism of review is state created, its
terms are set by state law. If the conviction is attacked in federal
court, the law of federal habeas corpus governs access to review.'
The subject of this article is the law governing federal collateral
review of claims not properly raised in state court.
That law is anything but simple. It is a piecemeal doctrinal
construction, each part more readily explained by the circum-
stances of its addition than by its relation to a coherent whole. The
cumulation of category and exception threatens to obscure the un-
derlying objectives of federal habeas corpus and to oppress its ad-
ministration. That reform is needed, few will doubt. But the ap-
propriate direction of reform is hotly controverted. The disputes
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2 This remedy is provided by 28 USC § 2254 (1982). The analogous collateral remedy
for federal trials is provided by 28 USC § 2255 (1982). In important respects it parallels
§ 2254.
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transcend mere questions of doctrine; they strike deep into funda-
mental disagreements about what federal collateral review should
seek to do.
It would be vain to suppose that doctrinal reconstruction can
altogether bridge such divisions or persuade those who find the
premises of our argument uncongenial. Nevertheless, our purpose
is to propose doctrinal reform of the requirements for federal col-
lateral review of defaulted claims. We propose a radical simplifica-
tion of existing doctrine so that it can focus more directly on the
objectives we think habeas corpus, as distinct from direct review,
should serve in this context. We hope thereby to reduce the inevi-
table distance between doctrine and policy and to present a coher-
ent and plausible conception of the law in this field. Naturally, we
also hope to attract support for this view.
Section I surveys existing law. This involves two bodies of doc-
trine that, although separate in origin and divergent in content,
largely overlap. One is the line of cases, beginning with Wain-
wright v Sykes2, that articulates "cause" and "prejudice" as re-
quirements for federal habeas review of defaulted claims. The
other involves the Sixth Amendment right of effective assistance of
counsel, as that right is enforced on federal habeas.' Because these
doctrines cover much of the same ground, any plausible suggestion
for reform must take account of both.
Section II explains our proposal. We reject the increasing
proceduralization of habeas law and focus squarely on the sub-
stance of defaulted claims. The question, in our view, should be
whether consideration of a defaulted claim would present a realis-
tic possibility of correcting an unjust conviction or sentence of
death. If so, procedural barriers should be swept aside and collat-
eral review should be available. If not, the conviction or sentence
should stand without "appellate" correction on collateral review of
other trial errors. This reform would grant relief to those defen-
dants who deserve it, deny relief to others, and would do so while
simplifying the issues for lawyers and judges. Significantly, it
would also go some distance toward eliminating the retroactivity
issue that seems about to engulf habeas doctrine. Of course, the
focus on innocence is not original with us. Twenty years ago,
Henry Friendly suggested something similar for habeas corpus as a
2 433 US 72 (1977).
3 See Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 (1984).
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whole," and the concern for innocence is one of several strands that
run through Supreme Court opinions. Yet we think a good deal
more can be said for this view, particularly in the context of de-
faulted claims. Thus, Section II attempts to refine and defend that
position. Section III presents illustrative cases. Finally, Section IV
briefly examines certain related issues in the law of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel.
I. THE LAW OF PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
A. Stated Generally
A defendant whose lawyer fails to raise a claim at the time or
in the manner required by state procedures may lose the chance to
have that claim heard. Even if the claim is identified before ap-
peal, the appellate court may stand on the procedural default and
refuse to address the merits. Such refusal is permitted by federal
law and ordinarily will be respected by the Supreme Court in the
unlikely event of direct review.5 The same is true for claims prop-
erly raised at trial but not properly presented on appeal. Such de-
fault may justify the appellate court in refusing to hear the claim,
and its refusal will also bar direct review by the Supreme Court.
Sometimes, however, the defendant' can attack the default
collaterally. This can be done in two ways. First, under Wain-
wright v Sykes, the defendant can seek to undo the forfeiture by
showing "cause" for the default and "prejudice" resulting from it.
If these requirements are met, the federal court will consider the
merits of the defaulted claim, and if it is sound and its omission
not harmless, order a new trial (or, in a capital case, a new sentenc-
ing proceeding). Alternatively, the defendant can treat the lawyer's
failure to raise the claim as an independent constitutional viola-
" Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U Chi L Rev 142 (1970).
5 Of course, the procedures themselves must be constitutionally permissible and, in or-
der to bar Supreme Court review, "adequate" and "independent" of federal law. A fair num-
ber of cases have found state procedural defaults inadequate to preclude Supreme Court
review, but most mean less than they seem to say. See, for example, Williams v Georgia, 349
US 375, 383 (1955) (suggesting that a procedural default is not adequate to bar Supreme
Court review if the state court had the power to overlook it). In most of these cases, the
facts suggested bad faith manipulation of state procedures to defeat federal rights. See gen-
erally Peter W. Low and John C. Jeffries, Jr., Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-State
Relations 614-56 (Foundation, 2d ed 1989). Since such manipulation surely must be rare,
and in any event difficult to discern on direct review, Supreme Court findings of the inade-
quacy of state procedural grounds are very much the exception rather than the rule.
' For ease of exposition, habeas petitioners are referred to as "defendants."
7 Sykes, 433 US at 87-91.
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tion. Under Strickland v Washington, the attorney's failure to
raise a pertinent claim constitutes a denial of effective assistance
of counsel if the error fell below a certain standard of attorney
competence and likely affected the outcome of the prosecution.8
These two lines of attack are only partly convergent. Lawyer
error constituting ineffective assistance of counsel is indisputably
"cause" under Sykes,9 but only a small percentage of defaulted
claims involve such error. Effective assistance of counsel ostensibly
requires that the lawyer's conduct be "reasonable considering all
the circumstances,"' 0 but the Court has emphasized that the Sixth
Amendment claimant must overcome a "strong presumption" that
the lawyer's conduct fell within professional norms."' This means
that any colorable reason for not raising a claim (viewing the law-
yer's decision without benefit of hindsight) 2 defeats a defendant's
later assertion of a Sixth Amendment violation based on that de-
fault. In practice, the constitutional standard for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel approximates gross negligence.
Given this standard, it is less important that ineffective assis-
tance is "cause" than that most other attorney error is not. Ordi-
nary oversight, simple miscalculation, bad judgment-none consti-
tutes "cause" for failure to raise a constitutional claim.13 There is a
category of "cause" arising from wholly non-negligent er-
ror-failure to raise a claim the basis for which was created by a
subsequent change in the law' 4-but this category is narrowly con-
fined'5 and in any event inapplicable if a new pronouncement does
8 466 US 668, 687-96 (1984).
9 See Murray v Carrier, 477 US 478, 488 (1986).
11 Strickland, 466 US at 688.
21 Id at 689-91.
12 Id at 689 ("A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time.").
Is See, for example, Carrier, 477 US at 486-88; and Smith v Murray, 477 US 527, 534-
36 (1986).
24 Reed v Ross, 468 US 1, 13-16 (1984).
15 See Engle v Isaac, 456 US 107, 130-34 (1982). The defaulted claim in Engle was that
the jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted to the defendant the burden of proof on self-
defense. The trial occurred after In re Winship, 397 US 358 (1970) (establishing a constitu-
tional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases), but before the
Court had applied Winship to overturn rules shifting the burden of proof on some grading
elements, see Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684 (1975), or on intent generally, see Sandstrom
v Montana, 442 US 510 (1979). The Engle Court stated that "dozens" of defense lawyers
had challenged similar instructions by the time of the defendant's trial, but acknowledged
that such challenges "countered well-established principles of law." 456 US at 131-32. It
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not apply retroactively."6 (This category is necessary to allow retro-
active application of new rulings; otherwise, no institutional appa-
ratus would exist for implementing fully retroactive decisions.) Ad-
ditionally, "cause" will be found where a claim was not raised due
to "some objective factor external to the defense"'17 (not merely to
the defendant), such as government misconduct that suppresses
facts giving rise to the claim.' 8 But these rare cases aside, "cause"
for failing to raise a claim exists only where the misjudgment or
oversight amounts to an independent constitutional violation
under the Sixth Amendment, and the mistake must be truly egre-
gious to violate this standard.
The upshot of all this is easy to state, but hard to justify:
criminal defendants are often bound by the mistakes of their law-
yers. This might be tolerable if the stakes were less high, but the
prospect of defendants sitting in jail because of attorney error is at
least unsettling. This is the chief objection to both Sykes' 9 and
Strickland,2 0 at least among academics. Their proposed remedies
also are parallel. "Cause" should be defined more expansively,
along the lines of the deliberate bypass standard of Fay v Noia.2 '
found the fact that some defense counsel had made such arguments enough to preclude a
finding of "cause" for failure to do so.
26 See Allen v Hardy, 478 US 255 (1986) (per curiam) (holding that the rule of Batson v
Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986), should not be applied retroactively on federal habeas to con-
victions that became final before Batson was announced); see also Teague v Lane, 109 S Ct
1060 (1989) (plurality opinion) (concluding that rules that cannot be applied retroactively
on federal habeas cannot be announced on federal habeas); and Penry v Lynaugh, 109 S Ct
2934, 2944-47 (1989) (adopting Teague plurality's analysis and applying it to rules governing
the imposition of capital punishment).
27 Carrier, 477 US at 488.
18 See, for example, Amadeo v Zant, 486 US 214 (1988).
19 See, for example, Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federal-
ism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L J 1035, 1100-02 (1977); Barry Friedman, A
Tale of Two Habeas, 73 Minn L Rev 247 (1988); Graham Hughes, Sandbagging Constitu-
tional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and the Procedural Default Principle, 16 NYU Rev
L & Soc Change 321, 332 (1987-88); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal
Rights, 99 Harv L Rev 1128, 1215-18 (1986); Yale L. Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia:
Procedural Defaults by Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 Minn L Rev 341, 425 (1978);
and Peter W. Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel:
The Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 Stan L Rev 1, 67 (1978).
20 See, for example, Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old
Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 Colum L Rev 9, 81-100 (1986); Gary Goodpaster, The
Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14
NYU Rev L & Soc Change 59, 67 (1986); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No
Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Coun-
sel, 13 Hastings Const L Q 625, 640-45 (1986).
21 372 US 391, 438 (1963) (holding that the independent and adequate state ground
doctrine does not limit the scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, and that a federal
court has discretion to deny relief only where an applicant "has deliberately by-passed the
The University of Chicago Law Review [57:679
Similarly, ineffective assistance of counsel should be expanded to
cover a wider range of merely negligent mistakes.2 In these sugges-
tions, the critics share the Court's approach, if not its conclusions.
They would continue to inquire into the reason for a default in
order to assess its enforceability. 23 The differences lie chiefly in the
showings that would suffice.
If the defendant can show Strickland ineffectiveness or other
Sykes "cause," the court's attention then turns to "prejudice."
Here, too, habeas and Sixth Amendment doctrine converge, for
both require a showing of "prejudice." The term means some like-
lihood-greater than that sufficient to create a reasonable doubt
but perhaps less than "more likely than not"-that the error or
default affected the outcome of the prosecution. Strickland ex-
presses the idea this way:
The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasona-
ble probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confi-
dence in the outcome.24
The Court has not expressly adopted this test for the "prejudice"
prong of Sykes, but its opinions suggest something very similar.25
orderly procedure of the state courts"). See, for example, Meltzer, 99 Harv L Rev at 1215-22
(cited in note 19) (arguing for a deliberate bypass standard, with conscious decisions by
defense counsel counting as deliberate bypass); Tague, 31 Stan L Rev at 38-56 (cited in note
19) (arguing that the Court should have limited the scope of claims that can be raised on
federal habeas instead of enforcing procedural defaults).
2 See, for example, sources cited in note 20. This argument is often coupled with the
suggestion that the prejudice requirement be scrapped. See, for example, Berger, 86 Colum
L Rev at 89-100 (cited in note 20). The critics who argue for a broader conception of ineffec-
tiveness and abandonment of the prejudice requirement largely endorse the position taken
by Justice Marshall in his Strickland dissent. 466 US at 707-15 (Marshall dissenting).
23 Two notable exceptions are Jack A. Guttenberg, Federal Habeas Corpus, Constitu-
tional Rights, and Procedural Forfeitures: The Delicate Balance, 12 Hofstra L Rev 617,
702-14 (1984); and Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and
the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U Chi L Rev 1380, 1419-29 (1983). Professor Guttenberg
reaches a conclusion close to ours-we should say ours is close to his-but the structure of
the arguments is different and, in at least one important respect, we reach a different result.
Compare Guttenberg, 12 Hofstra L Rev at 716-17 (arguing that courts should categorize
constitutional protections as guilt-related or not) with text at notes 48-49 (suggesting that
such categorization is both difficult and unnecessary).
24 Strickland, 466 US at 694.
25 See United States v Frady, 456 US 152, 168-69 (1982), which, like Strickland, de-
fines "prejudice" in terms that avoid both the conventional harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard and the more-likely-than-not outcome determinative test. Both Frady and
Strickland link "reasonable probability" of affecting outcome with due process notions of
fundamental fairness. Compare Frady, 456 US at 169, quoting Cupp v Naughten, 414 US
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Note the nature of this standard. All agree that errors harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt do not require reversal of a convic-
tion, whether on direct appeal or collateral review. This simply rec-
ognizes the futility of a search for perfection. But the Court's
"reasonable probability" standard of prejudice requires a much
higher likelihood of effect on the outcome than the mere possibility
of reasonable doubt. Moreover, the "reasonable probability" stan-
dard applies to errors of all sorts. An omitted claim that has less
than a "reasonable probability" of affecting the outcome is barred,
whether it concerns factual guilt or merely the enforcement of a
prophylactic rule. The outcome-oriented definition of "prejudice"
thus treats the possibility of a factually erroneous conviction and
the possibility of mistaken nonenforcement of a prophylactic rule
as equally (non)serious.
An obvious alternative is to shift the focus from the likelihood
of effect on the outcome to the kind of effect that should matter.
"Prejudice" could be used to differentiate among defaulted claims
according to their impact on guilt. This approach would restrict
collateral review of defaulted claims, but in a different way from
the indiscriminate requirement of heightened likelihood of an ef-
fect on outcome, as reflected in the definition of "reasonable
probability."
The Supreme Court has toyed with this approach, but its pro-
nouncements to date are mixed and inconclusive. It has supported
a safety valve exception to the requirement of "cause." Where pro-
cedural default has "probably resulted in the conviction of one
who is actually innocent," habeas relief is available without regard
to the nature of the lawyer's error. 6 This willingness to overlook
141, 147 (1973) (the habeas "prejudice" standard is "whether the ailing instruction by itself
so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process"), with Strick-
land, 466 US at 696 ("the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of
the proceeding whose result is being challenged").
Despite these parallels, the matter is sufficiently unclear that some argue that the two
"prejudice" standards differ. See James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure § 24.5(d) at 357-58 (Michie, 1988) (suggesting that Sykes prejudice is "consistent
with traditional harmless error analysis"); and Maria L. Marcus, Federal Habeas Corpus
After State Court Default: A Definition of Cause and Prejudice, 53 Fordham L Rev 663,
701-03 (1985) (arguing that Sykes "prejudice" is actually more stringent than Strickland
"prejudice").
" Carrier, 477 US at 495-96, quoting Engle v Isaac, 456 US 107, 135 (1982):
"[A]s we [] noted in Engle, '[i]n appropriate cases' the principles of comity and finality
that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice 'must yield to the imperative of cor-
recting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.' . . . We remain confident that, for the
most part, 'victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the cause-and-
prejudice standard.' ... But we do not pretend that this will always be true. Accord-
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"cause" to avoid a "miscarriage of justice" is welcome, but the
Court's accommodation is only partial, for the exception applies
only to the "extraordinary" case where the showing of actual inno-
cence rises to the required level of probability.27 Nevertheless, the
"miscarriage of justice" exception does indicate, in partial answer
to Henry Friendly, that innocence is not altogether irrelevant in
habeas review.2 s
On the Sixth Amendment side, the Court's interest in inno-
cence as the criterion of "prejudice" has been even less consistent.
In Nix v Whiteside,2" the Court rejected the ineffective assistance
claim of a defendant deterred from committing perjury by his law-
yer's threat to disclose the falsehood. Whiteside is famous for the
Court's endorsement of the lawyer's aggressive steps to prevent cli-
ent perjury.30 Less attention has been paid to the gloss Whiteside
seemed to place on Sixth Amendment "prejudice." All nine Jus-
tices concluded that, even if defense counsel acted incompetently
and even if that action had the requisite effect on outcome, coun-
sel's behavior still would not have been prejudicial. The reason was
apparently that perjury is criminal conduct that detracts from the
reliability of judgments.3 1 If the right to effective assistance of
counsel aims to promote reliable outcomes, then any effect on out-
come flowing from the Whiteside lawyer's threat to expose perjury
would not count for Sixth Amendment purposes. As Justice Black-
mun put it, "this Court must ask whether its confidence in the out-
come of Whiteside's trial is in any way undermined by the knowl-
edge that he refrained from presenting false testimony. ' 32 The
obvious answer was no.
Whiteside suggested that some errors affecting outcome can-
not establish Strickland "prejudice" (or, by hypothesis, Sykes
"prejudice"), and that the kind of errors that do not count are
ingly, we think that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has prob-
ably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court
may grant the writ even in the absence of showing of cause for the procedural default."
Accord Harris v Reed, 109 S Ct 1038, 1043 (1989); and Smith v Murray, 477 US 527, 537
(1986).
27 Carrier, 477 US at 495-96.
2" Friendly, 38 U Chi L Rev 142 (cited in note 4).
29 475 US 157 (1986).
30 Id at 174-75. See Brent R. Appel, The Limited Impact of Nix v. Whiteside on Attor-
ney-Client Relations, 136 U Pa L Rev 1913 (1988); Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confi-
dences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U Pa L Rev 1939 (1988); and
Patrick R. Grady, Nix v. Whiteside: Client Perjury and the Criminal Justice System: The
Defendant's Position, 23 Am Crim L Rev 1 (1985).
3' 475 US at 175-76; id at 184-88 (Blackmun concurring).
22 Id at 185 (Blackmun concurring).
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those that do not affect the factual reliability of the determination
of guilt. This reading was undercut, however, later that Term in
Kimmelman v Morrison."3 Neil Morrison was convicted of rape in
state court, based in part on laboratory tests of a bedsheet that
had been seized, apparently illegally, from his apartment.3 4 Morri-
son's lawyer had failed to file a timely motion to suppress the bed-
sheet and lab reports. Federal habeas review of the Fourth Amend-
ment claim was barred by Stone v Powell, which held that a
Fourth Amendment claim can be raised on federal habeas review
only where there was not a full and fair opportunity to have the
claim heard in state court. 5 Morrison therefore pursued a Sixth
Amendment claim, arguing that his lawyer had been ineffective in
failing to raise this issue.
The Court unanimously found that Stone v Powell did not bar
the Sixth Amendment claim, even though it was based on default
of a Fourth Amendment objection. The Justices further found that
the lawyer's performance fell below standards of professional com-
petence, but they divided over the kind of "prejudice" that Morri-
son had to show. Justice Brennan's majority opinion looked for a
"reasonable probability" of effect on outcome: if there was a rea-
sonable likelihood that his counsel's incompetence affected the
outcome of the prosecution, Morrison was entitled to habeas re-
lief.36 Justice Powell, writing for himself and two others, looked for
an effect on innocence. Powell argued that the right to effective
assistance of counsel was designed to prevent unjust outcomes and
that the attorney's error in no way rendered the conviction un-
just.-" Powell nevertheless voted to grant relief on the ground that
the state had not raised the issue of Strickland "prejudice." For
the same reason, he maintained that the Court's opinion should
not be read to foreclose an innocence-based conception of
"prejudice," although the majority's language seemed to do just
that."
3 477 US 365 (1986).
Id at 368-69. The seizure was warrantless, but it was not clear whether exigent cir-
cumstances were present. No court had ruled on the legality of the search when the Su-
preme Court decided the case.
35 428 US 465 (1976).
36 477 US 365, 379-80, 391 (1986). The Court did not apply this test itself but re-
manded the case to the lower courts.
37 Id at 394-97 (Powell concurring in the judgment).
U Id at 397-98 (Powell concurring in the judgment). Compare id at 380 (majority state-
ment that "we decline to hold either that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel
belongs solely to the innocent or that it attaches only to matters affecting the determination
of actual guilt").
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Whiteside and Kimmelman are hard to reconcile. Both cases
dealt with lawyer acts that enhance, rather than undermine, one's
confidence in the factual accuracy of the convictions. In Whiteside,
that fact seems to have convinced the Court that the lawyer's con-
duct, even if incompetent, did not merit remedy. In Kimmelman,
the Court reached the opposite conclusion. 9 Kimmelman is also in
obvious tension with Stone v Powell, and for the same reason.
Stone precludes federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment
claims because they do not undermine the finding of guilt; Kim-
melman allows the defendant to make an end-run around Stone by
recharacterizing a defaulted Fourth Amendment claim as a Sixth
Amendment violation. Under Kimmelman, Sixth Amendment
"prejudice" is shown by an effect on outcome, even if, as on the
facts of that case, it actually increases the factual reliability of the
conviction.
B. An Illustrative Application
The preceding discussion states the law, but it gives scant fla-
vor of the elaborate decisionmaking required of federal habeas
courts in procedural default cases. To get some idea of the opera-
tional complexity of these doctrines (and of certain related matters
that we have not recounted fully), we suggest the following
hypothetical.
. Imagine a defendant whose lawyer fails to move to suppress an
arguably involuntary confession until the beginning of the trial.
The state has a rule requiring that such motions be made before
trial but allowing trial courts to consider late motions on a discre-
tionary basis.40 The trial judge decides that the motion should not
be heard, both because there is no excuse for the untimeliness and
because, in any event, "the confession plainly appears to be volun-
tary." After conviction and appeal, the defendant seeks federal
habeas corpus. He seeks both to have the habeas court determine
the voluntariness of his confession and to attack his lawyer's fail-
ure to raise that issue as ineffective assistance of counsel. How
would a federal district judge (or magistrate) dedicated to imple-
menting Supreme Court decisions proceed in this case?
3 The leading treatise endorses Kimmelman's position. See Wayne LaFave and Jerold
H. Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 11.10(d) at 50 (West, Supp 1989).
40 Rules providing for court discretion to consider late suppression motions are com-
mon. See, for example, Colo R Grim P 41(g) (1984); Conn Gen Stat Ann § 54-33f(b) (West,
1985); Fla R Crim P 3.190(i) (West, 1973).
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With respect to the confession's voluntariness, the first issue is
whether the trial judge's statement of the grounds for decision sat-
isfied the required plain statement of reliance on the procedural
default, or whether the claim was "really" decided on the merits.4'
If the state court addressed the merits, the federal court should do
likewise. If the state court did not reach the merits, the next issue
is whether the state's procedural requirement was fairly applied.
This resolves into the question of whether the state court's discre-
tion to consider late claims vitiated the requirement that claims be
timely made. If procedural foreclosure ordinarily was not invoked
in such cases, the federal habeas court should address the merits.42
If such defaults were routinely enforced, the court should proceed
to the Sykes test of "cause" and "prejudice."
Was there "cause" for the default, apart from the lawyer's al-
leged ineffectiveness? Conceivably so, if the defendant could show
"some objective factor external to the defense" that would have
prevented the attorney from recognizing the claim and raising it in
a timely fashion;43 otherwise not, as there was no colorable claim of
"new law." If "cause" is found, the court should inquire into
whether the claim of involuntariness had a "reasonable
probability" of affecting the outcome. If "cause" is not found, the
court should ask whether failure to consider the involuntariness
claim would "probably" result in the continued incarceration of
one who is "actually innocent.
44
There is a second progression of issues for the ineffective assis-
tance claim (and for ineffective assistance as the most likely form
of Sykes "cause"). Did the attorney's failure to move to suppress
fall below minimal standards of professional competence? This
question may be troublesome, as it requires estimation of the ap-
parent strength of such a motion at the time filing was required,
given the information then available to counsel. 45 If ineffective as-
sistance is found, the court should inquire (as above) into the "rea-
41 See Harris v Reed, 109 S Ct 1038 (1989).
42 See, for example, Ulster County Court v Allen, 442 US 140, 147-54 (1979).
43 The quoted language comes from Carrier, 477 US at 488. Amadeo v Zant, 486 US
214 (1988), provides an example of such an "objective factor"; the state suppressed informa-
tion that could have supported a claim that the defendant's grand jury and petit jury were
discriminatorily selected.
" Carrier, 477 US at 496. Accord, Harris, 109 S Ct at 1043.
"5 See Strickland, 466 US at 689-90, on the importance of avoiding hindsight when
assessing the competence of an attorney's acts.
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sonable probability" of the mistake affecting the outcome. If inef-
fective assistance is not found, the court should deny relief.46
This fairly simple example makes an obvious point: the deci-
sion tree for habeas review of defaulted claims is intricate and
costly. To be sure, in many cases, the issues raised in the preceding
paragraphs will be easy. Often, "cause" and "prejudice" are plainly
absent, and the court can dispose of the petition without great ef-
fort. But many of these issues require intricate analysis and pre-
sent opportunities for error. Most importantly, those legal issues
seem largely unrelated to the merits of the defendant's claim. This
is surely the greatest vice of the current system. Cases like the hy-
pothetical discussed above are analyzed and resolved without any
serious attention to whether the defendant's claim is one that war-
rants relief.47
In essence, Sykes and Strickland require habeas lawyers and
federal judges and magistrates to work through the equivalent of a
law school exam every time a defendant tries to escape procedural
default. We mean no disrespect to those who labor in this field
when we voice the suspicion that most do not routinely track the
ins and outs of this progression. In practice, federal habeas review
may well be more direct, more casual, less preoccupied with the
procedural preliminaries of habeas corpus, and more responsive to
the court's perception (perhaps very quickly attained) of the mer-
its of the claim. All this may be true. It may even be true that,
despite the aesthetic sensibilities of academics and the sympa-
thetic frustration of their students, habeas review achieves gener-
ally reasonable results. But even if such speculation were verified,
it would not justify complacency about the law of procedural fore-
closure, for it cannot be a very great recommendation of existing
law that it works tolerably well when largely ignored.
46 A further puzzle is whether the exhaustion requirement demands that the defendant
have presented his ineffective assistance claim to any then-available state court. The Court
seems to have said that exhaustion is required whether the defendant is raising ineffective
assistance as an independent claim or as Sykes "cause" for a procedural default. See Car-
rier, 477 US at 488-89. If that is so, the adjudication of defaulted claims involves yet an-
other layer of complication.
47 The question of effective assistance of counsel is not a close proxy for the question of
the merits of the claim because the court is only to consider what the lawyer knew (or
should have known) at the time the claim was defaulted. The lawyer's reasonable assess-
ment at the time and the actual merits of the claim (as judged by hindsight) are potentially
very different issues.
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II. REFORMING HABEAS REVIEW OF DEFAULTED CLAIMS
We favor reorienting habeas review of defaulted claims toward
protection of the arguably innocent. This means that defendants
should have easy access to habeas review where consideration of
the defaulted claim might correct an unjust conviction (or sentence
of death), but not otherwise. Such an approach would be both
more and less restrictive than existing law. It would be more re-
strictive in that it would limit Sykes and Strickland "prejudice" to
those omissions that impair the reliability of the finding of guilt.
Where, as in Kimmelman, a default only enhances the reliability of
a conviction, it would not be set aside on habeas corpus. At the
same time, our approach would be less restrictive than existing law
in that we would junk the requirement of "cause." We would not
undertake to characterize the lawyer's error as competent, incom-
petent, negligent, non-negligent, or whatever. We would ask simply
whether the error might have caused an unjust result. If so, we
would grant habeas relief despite the absence of "cause"; if not, we
would deny review despite effect on outcome.
Our focus is on factual innocence. By that phrase, we mean to
include anyone who did not commit the crime with which he or she
is charged. This includes defendants who are guilty of some crime
but not the offense charged. In other words, factual innocence
comprehends both the fact and grade of criminal liability. Of
course, the "facts" supporting criminal liability are really findings
or conclusions reached by the trier of fact, although we hope these
conclusions closely correspond to real-world events. A claim sug-
gesting "factual innocence" is, therefore, one that, if heard by the
trier of fact, would militate with some appreciable force against the
findings or conclusions needed to support criminal liability.
The arguable innocence standard can be expressed in many
ways. The approach closest to the Court's own language would re-
quire the defendant to show a "reasonable probability" that the
procedural default resulted in an erroneous conviction. We prefer
"reasonable possibility" because it avoids the implication that fac-
tual innocence need be more likely than not. If relief were to be
granted only on proof of actual probability of innocence, the
Court's "miscarriage of justice" exception to "cause" would be suf-
ficient. In our view, however, refusal to consider a defaulted claim
is objectionable if there is any significant prospect of a factually
erroneous conviction (or an unjustified sentence of death) resulting
from that default. We think that that is true where the prospect of
erroneous conviction is distinctly less than probable. At the same
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time, we do not mean to endorse habeas review of claims whose
supposed benefit to the defendant is fanciful or remote. We sug-
gest the phrase "reasonable possibility" to capture this combina-
tion of leniency and realism.
This approach obviously resembles Henry Friendly's sugges-
tion, delivered with characteristic elegance and force, that habeas
relief be limited to those petitioners who can make a colorable
showing of factual innocence. Our proposal for defaulted claims
also resembles the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Stone
v Powell, which barred most habeas review of Fourth Amendment
claims based on the non-guilt-related character of those claims.48
But while the thrust of all these models is to take innocence into
account on federal habeas review, the approaches differ in imple-
mentation. Judge Friendly's standard apparently would allow liti-
gation of non-guilt-related claims in cases that, for reasons unre-
lated to those claims, were close on the merits.49 Stone, on the
other hand, seems to require the categorization of constitutional
claims in the abstract as guilt-related or not-a task that is partic-
ularly problematic for those constitutional rights that may protect
innocence in some contexts but not others.
Asking whether the default raised a reasonable possibility of
an unjust conviction avoids both difficulties. Defendants would not
automatically be permitted to relitigate the merits of the charges
against them by virtue of having, for example, a legally plausible
defaulted Fourth Amendment claim. And there would be no need
to decide, as a categorical matter, whether a given constitutional
right protects innocence or some other cluster of interests; the is-
'8 428 US 465 (1976).
4' See Friendly, 38 U Chi L Rev 142 (cited in note 4). In other words, Judge Friendly
would reopen claims on federal habeas corpus that we would not. Consider, for example, two
rape cases. In both the evidence could have supported either conviction or acquittal; in both
the defendants were convicted in part on judgments as to credibility. Also, consent was the
only issue in both cases; intercourse was established by laboratory analysis of a bedsheet
from the defendant's apartment. In case one, the bedsheet was illegally seized, but defense
counsel failed to move to suppress it. In case two, the bedsheet was obtained lawfully.
As we read Judge Friendly, he would allow relitigation of the defaulted claim in case
one. We would not because, from the standpoint of remedying injustice, the two cases
should be treated the same. Both defendants were convicted in close cases, meaning that
either defendant could have made a colorable showing of innocence. The fact that the de-
fendant in case one has a plausible Fourth Amendment claim has nothing to do with that
showing, since the bedsheet did not in any way undermine the accuracy of the jury's deter-
mination. On the contrary, it properly focused the jury's attention on consent, the only real
question in the case. Unless one is prepared to relitigate all cases in which the factual judg-
ment at trial was a close one, one should not grant relief because of the procedural default
in such a case.
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sue would be reduced to whether innocence is plausibly at stake in
the particular case at hand.
More importantly, Stone and Judge Friendly propose solu-
tions to the general problem of how to allocate federal habeas re-
lief. The premise of their proposals is that, for the most part,
habeas corpus relief should aim to rectify particular injustices, and
not (for example) to deter inattention to federal law on the part of
recalcitrant state judges. We generally agree with that premise,
but-and this is important-our proposal does not depend on it.
No matter what one's approach to allocating habeas relief gener-
ally, there is no good argument against focusing on innocence
when dealing with defaulted claims.
The test proposed here at least has the virtues of simplicity
and directness. The real issue is not whether our test would sim-
plify habeas review, but whether it would improve it. A "reasona-
ble possibility" of innocence standard is about as economical and
uncomplicated as any legal standard is likely to be. The question is
whether it is also right.
A. The Affirmative Argument
It is easy to argue for using habeas review to protect against
injustice. No habeas petitioner evokes more sympathy than one
who can show a reasonable possibility of innocence based on proce-
dural default. In such a case, there is a colorable showing that pro-
cedural error caused the administration of justice to go fundamen-
tally wrong. A proper regard for the relative values at stake
demands that we forgive the procedural default. This is not to say
that the state's interests in the integrity of its procedures and in
the finality of its judgments are trivial. It is only to say that those
values are not absolute; they should give way to the imperative of
correcting injustice. We think this simple statement a sufficient ex-
planation of the grounds for habeas review of defaulted claims
where there is a reasonable possibility of innocence. In our view, it
also applies to the analogous case of a prisoner sentenced to death
who can show a reasonable possibility of a factually unjustified
sentence. It is unthinkable to send a defendant to execution with-
out considering such a claim.
B. The Negative Argument
The hard part of the argument is to show that habeas review
of defaulted claims should be unavailable when the default does
not undermine the factual reliability of the conviction. Kim-
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melman v Morrison is an example.50 There the lawyer's failure to
raise the Fourth Amendment claim likely had a decisive effect on
outcome, 51 but did not conceivably affect the reliability of the con-
viction. At trial, the defendant claimed that he and the victim had
not had sexual relations. The bedsheet and lab reports that were
admitted into evidence, but that might have been excluded had
the lawyer objected, tended to confirm the falsity of the defen-
dant's claim. 52 It is our view-contrary to the prevailing opinion
among academics and to much of the Court's current doc-
trine-that such defaults should not be undone on federal habeas
review.
In part, this view rests on the state's legitimate interest in the
finality of its criminal judgments. Federal habeas review, which
comes only after one (and often two) full rounds of litigation,
should not be equated with the first-line appellate function of cor-
recting all errors. Finality of judgments is an important value, as is
confirmed by the law's regard for civil judgments. For all the rea-
sons identified by Paul Bator-conservation of judicial resources,
maintenance of a sense of importance and responsibility associated
with the criminal trial, the need to avoid sending mixed signals
about the defendant's punishment or rehabilitation, and avoidance
of the institutional paralysis that flows from leaving decisions al-
ways open to challenge-criminal convictions, once obtained and
affirmed on appeal, should not be lightly set aside. 3 This is not to
say that direct review should be similarly restricted. On the con-
trary, it is to assert a distinction between direct and collateral re-
view in terms of the kinds of problems that resources should be
used to correct.
These concerns are greatly bolstered if, as Justice Stevens has
surmised,54 the fact that a claim was not raised at trial suggests its
irrelevance. Massaged by a trained advocate, a given set of facts
may yield a great many constitutional claims. Some are obvious
and central to the case; others are inventive long-shots. Like Jus-
o 477 US 365 (1986).
51 See Morrison v Kimmelman, 650 F Supp 801, 809 (D NJ 1986) (on remand) (con-
cluding that the failure to suppress the bedsheet "dramatically affected the evidentiary pic-
ture in this case").
52 See id at 808-09.
'3 Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Pris-
oners, 76 Harv L Rev 441, 451-53 (1963).
" See Engle v Isaac, 456 US at 136 n 1 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509, 547-48 n 17 (1982) (Stevens dissenting); Carrier, 477 US
at 506 n 13 (Stevens concurring in the judgment); and Wainwright v Sykes, 433 US 72, 96-
97 (1977) (Stevens concurring).
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tice Stevens, we suspect that even marginally competent lawyers
ordinarily raise those claims that the facts most nearly support.
The claims most likely to go unmentioned are those that are le-
gally remote or factually fanciful. It seems likely, therefore, that
successive habeas petitions based on defaulted claims will be in-
creasingly occupied with the chaff of constitutional argumenta-
tion."s Of course, the occasional exception is precisely the point of
habeas review, but the probabilities involved are certainly relevant
in assessing the state's interest in the finality of convictions.5 6
In addition to its proper interest in finality, the state has a
significant interest in enforcing the procedural rules that give rise
to defaults. States have good and legitimate reasons for requiring
timely presentation of claims; an orderly adjudicative process de-
pends on such requirements. It is wasteful to wait until trial to
decide whether the key piece of government evidence is admissible,
and also wasteful to have a second round of review because the
litigant did not raise the winning claim on the first appeal. These
concerns are no makeweight. Critics of the procedural default doc-
trine argue that "mere" timing rules are not important enough to
justify precluding constitutional claims, yet virtually no one argues
that such timing rules should be dispensed with in federal prac-
tice.5 7 Surely if federal courts are entitled to insist on routine com-
pliance with sensible procedures in their own trials, state courts
should also be entitled to do so.
This may also explain why federal courts are usually content to screen habeas peti-
tions with rather cursory procedures. See 28 USC § 2254 Rule 4 (1982) (authorizing such a
process).
" An additional concern might, at least in theory, augment the state's interest in final-
ity. Defense lawyers might abuse federal habeas corpus by intentionally defaulting on their
federal claims in state court in order to save them for subsequent federal review. The occur-
rence of such "sandbagging" is hard to disprove, but we doubt its frequency. Defendants
have strong and obvious incentives to seek state court adjudication of their federal claims,
even if review is automatically available on federal habeas. Other things being equal, two
bites at the apple are better than one. Also, federal habeas review will be long delayed,
forcing the defendant to serve much of his sentence before obtaining relief. Even for claims
challenging death sentences, where the last factor is not relevant, the defendant loses the
opportunity to have his claim heard by state trial and appellate courts, on state collateral
review as well as on direct appeal. Finally, the usual incentives to raise constitutional claims
must be strongest when the claims are guilt-related, and those are the claims for which we
would ignore attorney performance. For these and other reasons, the sandbagging argument
has been criticized by commentators who otherwise differ greatly on habeas issues. See
Friedman, 73 Minn L Rev at 292 (cited in note 19); Friendly, 38 U Chi L Rev at 158-59
(cited in note 4); Guttenberg, 12 Hofstra L Rev at 694-97 (cited in note 23); Meltzer, 99
Harv L Rev at 1197-99 (cited in note 19); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S Cal L Rev 837, 896-98
(1984); and Tague, 31 Stan L Rev at 43-46 (cited in note 19).
11 See Meltzer, 99 Harv L Rev at 1202-07 (cited in note 19).
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Of course, the states' interests in finality and in enforcing their
procedures are well understood. Different observers may weigh
them differently, but nobody denies their existence. The real issue
is whether these concerns are outweighed by some countervailing
interest in allowing habeas review of all outcome-related defaulted
claims. In other words, the argument against federal habeas review
of defaulted claims that do not go to factual guilt is clear; the
question is whether there is any strong argument for hearing such
claims.
. We can identify four arguments in favor of federal habeas re-
view of all defaulted claims. First, federal habeas relief might be
justified as a deterrent to unconstitutional conduct by state of-
ficers. Second, denial of habeas relief might be thought unfair to
defendants who are, in moral terms, identical to other defendants
whose lawyers raised similar claims in a timely fashion and who
consequently obtained relief. Third, federal habeas review might
be thought justified by the inherent importance of federal constitu-
tional rights, an argument usually cast as an assertion that there
should be no hierarchy among such rights. Fourth, review of non-
guilt-related claims might be thought necessary as a surrogate for
review of claims that bear directly on guilt or innocence, but that
are difficult or impossible to identify. We consider each of these
arguments in turn in the sections that follow."
58 All four of the arguments view the process of hearing defaulted claims as valuable for
instrumental reasons-because it promotes good outcomes in particular cases, deters official
misconduct, or affirms the importance of constitutional rights. One might take a different
approach and argue that the process of hearing defaulted claims is valuable not for what it
accomplishes, but for its own sake.
Frankly, we consider this position untenable. Process costs money, and it seems sensible
to use the limited resources available to our criminal justice system where they will do the
most good. For that reason, we start from the premise that process is a means of achieving
certain substantive outcomes outside the courtroom-in this context, the proper allocation
of criminal punishment and compliance with federal law by state and local officials. Obvi-
ously, those who view process as an end rather than a means will find our proposal
mistaken.
A variant on this non-instrumental position might be that habeas review is valuable for
the satisfaction it gives habeas petitioners, whether or not it achieves any substantive ends.
A rich literature (one in which we are far from expert) explores the concept of party satis-
faction and its relevance to a society's choices about legal process. See, for example, E. Allan
Lind and Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice 93-106 (Plenum,
1988); John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis 67-
101 (Wiley, 1975). That literature is both important and potentially useful in thinking about
how to structure existing systems of dispute resolution. We do not, however, think it useful
for deciding whether to litigate a given claim or dispute in the first place. Perhaps habeas
petitioners gain some sense of satisfaction from raising Kimmelman-type defaulted claims
in federal court. But if litigating such claims accomplishes nothing beyond making petition-
ers feel good, we have no hesitation in saying it is not worth the costs it imposes on the
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1. Deterrence of unconstitutional conduct.
The deterrence argument for habeas relief in cases such as
Kimmelman is familiar. The police officer who conducted an ar-
guably illegal search presumably wanted to solve a crime and catch
a rapist. Undoing the procedural default, vacating the conviction,
and suppressing the evidence in a new trial will send a signal to
officers in similar positions that illegal searches do not pay.59 This
argument does not depend on factual innocence; it justifies habeas
relief with reasons wholly independent of that concern.60
There are, however, good (and familiar) reasons to believe that
habeas relief for defaulted claims is, in deterrence terms, insignifi-
cant. To be effective, the prospect of deterrence must be visible ex
ante. So viewed, the deterrent effect of federal habeas review of
defaulted claims is likely to be trivial. The police handle a great
many cases. In some cases, constitutional violations would be so
obvious and so central as to preclude prosecution altogether. In
those cases that go to trial, arguable constitutional violations will
almost certainly be raised by defense counsel. The few exceptions,
such as Kimmelman, cannot be identified in advance. And any cost
to the police in terms of lost convictions will be long delayed. It
will come after trial, default, conviction, and affirmance on appeal.
Thus, although the matter is incapable of quantification, we are
confident that the incremental deterrent effect of federal habeas
review of defaulted constitutional claims is vanishingly slight."
federal judiciary, government lawyers, and litigants in other cases who suffer delays because
of crowded dockets.
"' This is the standard judicial justification for exclusion of evidence. See, for example,
United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 906 (1984); Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 486-88 (1976);
and United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 347-48 (1974). To be sure, some Justices offer
different justifications, as noted in James v Illinois, 110 S Ct 648, 651 n 1 (1990), but deter-
rence is, and has been for some time, the only rationale that commands a Supreme Court
majority.
10 At the outset, one should note an important, though not in itself debilitating, limita-
tion of this argument. Granting habeas relief can, at most, deter constitutional violations by
those who are trying to keep convicted defendants in jail. It cannot deter defense counsel,
who presumably have a different objective. If anything (we would guess that the effect is
small), defense counsel might have a greater incentive to raise claims in timely fashion if
they knew that their mistakes were irrevocable. On the other hand, it may be that any such
effect would be offset by the stigmatization of a finding of ineffectiveness, which would in-
crease rather than decrease the cost to the lawyer of procedural default. On balance, the
deterrent effect on defense counsel is probably not significant one way or the other, and we
therefore discount the effect on attorneys as a reason for granting or denying habeas relief.
61 This conclusion is buttressed by the absence of a comparable deterrence argument in
roughly analogous civil contexts. No one claims that a plaintiff who loses a product liability
case by failing to object to the introduction of some piece of evidence ought to be permitted
to relitigate the case in order to deter unsafe product design. In the civil context, the as-
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Of course, there is another possible target of deterrence. Fed-
eral habeas review might be directed not so much against state law
enforcement officers as against state judges.62 The Supreme Court
does not often say much about this point, but one's view of the
integrity and reliability of state courts is perhaps the single most
important factor in determining the appropriate role for federal
habeas corpus.
In defense of our proposed standard, we offer two observa-
tions. First, distrust of state courts warrants federal court relitiga-
tion of previously considered claims more than it warrants consid-
eration of defaulted claims. In other words, a frank mistrust of
state courts would more nearly justify Brown v Allen than Fay v
Noia.6s And if one were to assume that state courts systematically
skew Fourth Amendment decisions in favor of the government, the
sensible response would be to overrule Stone v Powell6 4 and insti-
tute routine federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims
heard and rejected in state court. Absent such review, it is hard to
sumption is that neutral procedural rules generate about an even number of mistaken out-
comes on each side, and that any bias from such rules is small. To be sure, the civil and
criminal contexts differ in important respects, but the differences do not substantially un-
dermine this conclusion. Also, the fact that tort scholarship, which is dominated by incen-
tive and deterrence arguments, has paid no notice to the effects of procedural timing rules
on primary conduct suggests that the ultimate effects on deterrence are probably too small
to worry about in both contexts.
There may be one class of cases where this point does not hold true. Where government
officials conceal evidence of their own misconduct, habeas review, while flawed, may be the
only deterrent available. But note that such misconduct will usually implicate innocence
concerns: a prosecutor who suppresses evidence of the defendant's innocence gives the de-
fendant a viable claim under any theory of prejudice. As for other claims, such as that the
government suppressed evidence of grand jury discrimination, the proper solution may be to
require state courts to hear such federal claims in the first instance, rather than to remedy
the problem via the law of defaulted claims. In any event, cases of this sort must be a small
subset of the cases governed by Sykes and Strickland, and can hardly justify treating all
outcome effects alike under those doctrines.
02 For an extended argument that federal habeas should play precisely this role, see
Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 NYU L Rev 991 (1985).
63 In Brown v Allen, 344 US 443 (1953), the Court determined that federal courts
should hear and decide federal constitutional claims that were rejected on the merits in
state court. In Fay v Noia, 372 US 391 (1963), the Court held that federal courts should
reach the merits of defaulted constitutional claims-i.e., claims that had never been decided
on the merits-unless the habeas petitioner deliberately withheld his claim in state court.
It is worth noting that Fay might be a good response to state court intransigence if
there were reason to believe that state courts were stretching procedural default rules to bar
subsequent federal habeas review of constitutional claims. In our view, the best solution to
that problem is to regulate state procedural default rules directly, to ensure that they (1)
are not unreasonably harsh, and (2) are applied fairly. For purposes of our argument, we
take as a given that the state rules governing procedural defaults meet these standards.
- 428 US 465 (1976).
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believe that the behavior of state judges would be much influenced
by the prospect of federal habeas review of the occasional case
where a winning Fourth Amendment claim is defaulted by defense
counsel. The exceptional nature of such cases, the difficulty of
their identification, and the long delay in obtaining judgments sug-
gest that habeas review of defaulted claims would have little bear-
ing on the general behavior of state judges. We think the system is
therefore free to decide defaulted claims with a view toward insur-
ing just outcomes in those cases rather than in pursuit of some
more general deterrence of state judges.
More broadly, and perhaps more importantly, we do not be-
lieve that any generalized mistrust of state courts is warranted to-
day. Anyone familiar with the Supreme Court's docket twenty or
thirty years ago could scarcely have escaped noticing that some
state courts, particularly in some areas and particularly with re-
spect to some litigants, were hostile to the enforcement of federal
rights. If, as we think, state courts were generally inhospitable to
federal rights, habeas review offered the only corrective; direct Su-
preme Court review of large numbers of federal claims was obvi-
ously impossible. Today, however, a review of the Supreme Court's
docket confirms that state court enforcement of the Constitution
has vastly improved. The Court sees mostly cases that we would
describe as borderline-disputes concerning the marginalia of con-
stitutional requirements-rather than, as was once true, cases sug-
gesting wholesale disinterest in constitutional guarantees. There is
some evidence to support this view,"" but it is ultimately as much a
question of evaluation as of observation. In any event, we record
our views frankly, not because they are directly relevant to the
problem of defaulted claims, but because they form the essential
background of our general views on the appropriate role of federal
habeas corpus.
2. Equality among defendants.
A second possible justification for an outcome-oriented defini-
tion of "prejudice" is equality among defendants. Kimmelman, one
might say, is not really about the need to deter unconstitutional
searches or to ensure that state judges take such claims seriously.
Rather, one might argue, Neil Morrison should be granted relief
" See Craig M. Bradley, Are State Courts Enforcing the Fourth Amendment? A Pre-
liminary Study, 77 Georgetown L J 251 (1988) (concluding, based on a study of appellate
opinions in nine states, that state courts do not systematically err in the government's favor
in adjudicating Fourth Amendment claims).
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because a similarly situated defendant with a better lawyer would
have raised the Fourth Amendment claim, had the bedsheet sup-
pressed, and vitiated the prosecutor's case. Quite plausibly, such a
defendant would have been acquitted. There is something wrong,
the argument goes, with a system that sends Morrison to jail but
lets his hypothetical counterpart rapist go free, where the only dif-
ference between the two is the performance of their lawyers. Gary
Goodpaster has put the point as follows:
Fairness to the defendant also requires that criminal defen-
dants be treated evenhandedly. Equal protection principles
should ensure that the criminal justice system, which relies on
defense attorneys of widely varying abilities, skills, knowledge,
industry, and professional moralities, does not treat similarly
situated defendants unequally. Similar defendants who have
committed similar crimes under similar circumstances ought
not to receive vastly different dispositions because of their re-
spective lawyers' varying professional attributes.6
This intuition has widespread currency, both in the classroom
and among thoughtful scholars, but we nevertheless think it wrong.
For one thing, the argument proves too much. The inequality com-
plained of is not unique to an innocence-based construction of
"prejudice." It exists also under the current regime. Under Sykes a
non-ineffective lawyer's error binds the client, placing the defen-
dant in a worse position than a hypothetical defendant who is sim-
ilarly situated but better represented. Nor could the problem be
solved by returning to the Fay rule that claims are defaulted only
by the defendant's deliberate bypass, or even by eliminating proce-
dural defaults altogether. So long as some defendants have better
lawyers than others, similarly situated defendants will fare differ-
ently-unequally, if you will-because of their attorneys.
But this objection strikes only a glancing blow at the equality
argument. That across-the-board equality cannot be achieved
hardly compels indifference to inequalities that can be corrected.
Our greater objection is that the particular inequality in question,
while troubling, does not have the moral force commonly ascribed
to it. To see why that is so, one need only shift attention from the
small-scale inequality among those prosecuted with varying grades
of defense counsel to the large-scale inequality between those who
are prosecuted for their crimes and those who are not. Many, prob-
ably most, criminals are not caught, and many of those who are
" Goodpaster, 14 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 65 (cited in note 20).
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caught are not prosecuted, in some instances because of police
oversight or mistake. The inequality between those who are and
those who are not caught and tried dwarfs any inequality about
which someone in Morrison's position can complain. Yet the much
greater arbitrariness resulting from imperfect law enforcement is
not commonly thought to raise serious fairness concerns.
Consider the following example. Two confederates rob a bank.
One is more slow-footed, less quick-witted, or more easily recog-
nized than the other, and he is caught and convicted. The other
gets away. The convicted robber undoubtedly feels aggrieved, but
no one, to our knowledge, believes that he has a strong moral claim
to equal treatment with his more fortunate confederate. This con-
clusion does not depend on the supposition that the reasons for the
different outcomes were beyond the government's control. The
lucky robber might escape only because of police negligence (fail-
ure to follow obvious leads, failure to take a suspect into custody at
the first opportunity, etc.). Indeed, he might escape punishment
only because of unconstitutional police behavior. If the police ille-
gally search his apartment, he would have a Fourth Amendment
claim while another robber would not. Again, no one, to our knowl-
edge, suggests that a properly prosecuted defendant should escape
punishment simply because the police erred in searching another.
The conviction of the one bank robber is not unjust, but merely
unlucky.17
Neil Morrison is in a position very much like the unlucky bank
robber. A factor unrelated to moral blameworthiness (police error
or lack of foot speed in the one case, a lawyer's mistake in the
other) is a but-for cause of his conviction. A perfectly just system
might acquit both Morrison and the bank robber on that ground,
for different treatment of like cases is surely a vice. In a system
striving to do justice within real-world constraints, however, the
bank robber's conviction is always deemed just because the de-
fendant did in fact commit the crime charged. The same should be
'7 To be sure, commentators do complain about the broad scope of prosecutorial discre-
tion, but not out of concern for these kinds of formally "unequal" outcomes. The most com-
mon concern is that, because of their vast authority, prosecutors may do a good deal of
under-the-table lawmaking and may exercise their discretion on illegitimate (and not simply
arbitrary) grounds. See, for example, James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial
Power, 94 Harv L Rev 1521, 1555-57 (1981). Commentators also note that prosecutors may
have incentives to not exercise their discretion in a consistently public-interested manner.
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J Legal
Stud 43, 49-53 (1988). These arguments identify systemic problems associated with
prosecutorial discretion, but they do not question the fairness of particular charging deci-
sions to the particular individuals involved.
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true for Morrison. Comparing him to another with a better lawyer
may prompt regret about the role of chance in life (and in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice), but it cannot make a sufficiently
strong moral case for exculpation. Were it otherwise, any defen-
dant could escape punishment simply by pointing to others, no less
guilty, who avoided criminal liability due to some police or
prosecutorial mistake.
A narrower version of the equality argument might seem more
promising. Some factors affecting the outcome of trials, even
though unrelated to the factual guilt or moral culpability of the
defendant, should be excluded because they are invidious. Race is
the plainest example, but perhaps not the only one. Pursuing this
line of reasoning, one might point out that attorney mistakes likely
correlate with client poverty, since poor defendants have court-ap-
pointed, and perhaps low-quality, counsel. In this view, the real
problem with letting the Kimmelman conviction stand is that it
may hurt defendants who are poor 68 and result in a particular kind
of inequality between poor and non-poor defendants.6 9
Here, too, the equality argument cuts too broadly to be con-
vincing. Wealth effects are not limited to, nor are they produced
by, trial procedure. A large portion of the prison population are
persons who, one might think, would not be there had they been
born into middle-class homes. We do not indulge the common but
insulting assumption that poor people commit crimes simply be-
cause they are poor. But we do think it plausible that many per-
sons who commit crimes would not be the persons they are (and
also would not face the temptations they face) had they been born
into better economic circumstances. Their claim of invidious treat-
ment on account of wealth seems at least as strong as Morrison's,
in the sense that poverty plausibly might be (but in any individual
case cannot be proved to be) a but-for cause of punishment.
Most courts and scholars have concluded, however, that pun-
ishing such people is not unjust, even if it reminds us of unattrac-
tive features of our society, because poverty did not in any real
sense compel the commission of crime.70 In other words, the per-
sons in question (at least by hypothesis) could have chosen not to
" This problem may not have occurred in Kimmelman itself, where the defendant re-
tained private counsel.
" Perhaps we should say rich and non-rich defendants, for poor defendants are not the
only ones who could have a complaint based on wealth inequality. Anyone unable to hire the
best could make a similar claim.
7 See, for example, United States v Alexander, 471 F2d 923, 968 (DC Cir 1973); San-
ford H. Kadish, Blame and Punishment 102-03 (MacMillan, 1987); and Stephen J. Morse,
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commit crimes, as do most persons who are similarly situated.
Their actions are in a sense "caused" by many factors, some of
which have no just bearing on punishment. But so long as the
defendant's own choice was one cause of the criminal conduct, con-
viction is just.71
Both for Morrison and for those defendants who might not
have committed crimes but for their poverty, the inequality is
something to be regretted. At the same time, the poor defendants
surely have the stronger claim for relief; they would not have com-
mitted crimes at all but for their poverty. Since that claim is not
granted by our criminal justice system, it is hard to see why Morri-
son's should be; his claim is only that he would have been able to
escape punishment for his crimes had he been wealthier.
Finally, it is important to note that not all constitutional
rights intrinsically require equal treatment of all individuals who
may be affected by their administration. Constitutional criminal
procedure contains many rules designed to deter governmental
misconduct. Implementing these rules benefits some defendants,
but that benefit is incidental to the purpose of the rules. It follows
that the benefits of such rules need not be made equally available
to all, just as the benefits of, say, a punitive damages award in a
civil case need not be equally distributed to all victims of the de-
fendant's tortious misconduct. Where a given constitutional re-
quirement is designed to deter police misconduct across the board
rather than to secure correct outcomes in individual cases, there is
no a priori reason why the protection of that requirement should
be equally or comprehensively available to all defendants.
The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S Cal L Rev 1247,
1251-54 (1976).
As the title of Morse's article suggests, the most prominent dissent from these views is
David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S Cal L Rev 385, 388-98 (1976).
For a recent response to Judge Bazelon and to his critics, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Just
Punishment in an Imperfect World, 87 Mich L Rev 1263, 1287-92 (1989) (reviewing David
L. Bazelon, Questioning Authority: Justice and Criminal Law (Knopf, 1988), and sug-
gesting that punishment of the sort described in the text is not fair but is nonetheless
necessary).
71 The key to this familiar point is to recognize that while many factors, some of them
random, may "cause" a criminal action, causation does not logically negate responsible
choice. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 Cal L Rev 1091, 1139-48
(1985); Stephen J. Morse, Psychology, Determinism, and Legal Responsibility, in The Ne-
braska Symposium on Motivation 35, 42-50 (U Nebraska, 1986). The argument is that in
many cases both of the following propositions are true: (1) the defendant would not have
committed the crime but for his (economically or otherwise) deprived background and cir-
cumstances; and (2) most persons from the same background and circumstances would not
commit comparable crimes.
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The most important example is the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule. Justified as a deterrent to unlawful searches, the ex-
clusionary rule results in a windfall for the lucky defendant whose
conviction depends on use of the illegally seized evidence. Nothing
in the Fourth Amendment, nor in ordinary notions of fairness, re-
quires that this windfall be extended to all who might claim it.
That is why the Court has felt free to weigh the marginal cost
against the marginal benefit and decide that exclusion shall some-
times be unavailable. 72 A defendant whose house was searched
with a warrant but without probable cause may not be able to sup-
press the evidence-even though the magistrate who issued the
warrant got the case wrong. 3 In contrast, a defendant searched
without a warrant would be entitled to suppress the evidence. The
difference between the two is purely instrumental. Police officers
are in a sense partisans: their job is to catch and help convict
criminals. Suppressing evidence when they misbehave thus takes
away the benefit they derive from their search. Magistrates, on the
other hand, are identified more with adjudication than with law
enforcement. Thus, it may make sense to presume that they will
try to obey the underlying rules on their own, without the need of
any evidentiary club.74 The idea is that suppression has only slight
benefit in cases where magistrates mistakenly assess probable
cause, but is of far greater value where police officers make the
same mistake.
Of course, this conclusion may be empirically wrong. It may be
that excluding evidence in cases like United States v Leon would
be a more useful deterrent than the Court believes. Our point is
only that the decision is one that turns, at least under current
Fourth Amendment law, wholly on deterrence concerns. Conse-
quently, any resulting "inequality" in the distribution of the bene-
fits of exclusion does not vitiate the rationale for the underlying
entitlement.
72 See, for example, Walder v United States, 347 US 62 (1954) (allowing use of illegally
obtained evidence for purposes of impeachment); United States v Calandra, 414 US 338
(1974) (allowing use of illegally obtained evidence in grand jury proceedings); United States
v Janis, 428 US 433 (1976) (allowing use of illegally seized evidence, at least under some
circumstances, in civil tax proceedings); United States v Leon, 468 US 897 (1984) (allowing
use of illegally seized evidence when the officer relied in good faith on the issuance of a
warrant); and INS v Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032 (1984) (allowing use of illegally seized
evidence in deportation proceedings). Of course, the Court may have miscalculated in any
given case. One need not agree with the specific results to see that the Court has undertaken
an inquiry that is entirely consistent with the deterrence rationale for exclusion of evidence.
" See Leon, 468 US 897.
71 See id at 916-17.
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The same thing could be said about many other constitutional
claims. Confessions obtained in violation of Miranda75 or Mas-
siah"8 may sometimes be unreliable. To that extent, suppression
promotes reliable outcomes. But far more commonly, the state-
ments are suppressed in spite of their evidentiary value, as a
means of deterring the police from using tactics that might lead to
unacceptable abuse.7 7 In this common circumstance, suppression is
not intended to generate correct outcomes, but to use the threat of
incorrect outcomes to deter police misconduct. It follows that sup-
pression is a necessary evil. When that evil is not necessary, it
should not occur. This observation fits well with existing Miranda
doctrine. To take the most obvious example, defendants whose Mi-
randa rights are violated can suppress incriminating statements
made in response to the illegal interrogation, but the same defen-
dants cannot suppress other "fruits" of the police misconduct.7 8
This line does not reflect any difference in the circumstances of the
defendants; rather, it reflects deterrence factors that have nothing
to do with defendants' just desserts.
Once again, nothing in the nature of constitutional rules of
this sort requires that all claimants be equally entitled to their
benefits. Nor-at least to our way of thinking-is any overriding
notion of equality violated when some but not all defendants are
given a windfall benefit for the public good. The Neil Morrisons of
the world may or may not partake of that benefit, according to
judicial calculation of the public interest, but they should not be
heard to complain merely because they are denied a windfall that
the exclusionary rule bestows on others.
3. Affirmation of rights.
The third possible justification for hearing defaulted claims
that have no bearing on guilt is the affirmation, or vindication, of
constitutional rights. Affirmation of rights is a symbolic argument
(which is not to say that it is an unimportant one), and like many
symbolic arguments, its reach is unclear.
In its strongest form, this concern with vindication of rights
would imply that every constitutional violation must have a rem-
edy. Of course, any such notion is quickly curtailed by the doctrine
71 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
76 Massiah v United States, 377 US 201 (1964).
77 For general discussion of this point in the context of Miranda rights, see William J.
Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Va L Rev 761, 807-22 (1989).
79 See Oregon v Elstad, 470 US 298 (1985).
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of harmless error. 9 Many, probably most, constitutional violations
go unremedied because they are harmless. They are harmless, that
is, in that they do not affect outcomes. Viewed from a symbolic
concern for the affirmation of rights, constitutional violations that
do not affect outcomes might not be harmless at all. Though super-
ficially plausible, this view is widely rejected because it would de-
mand a perfection in the administration of justice that no human
institution can achieve. Therefore, affirmation of rights is usually
said to require the remedying of all non-harmless errors, although
it is hard to see why that is anything more than an arbitrary stop
in the reasoning.
More commonly, the concern for affirmation of rights takes
the form of the negative claim that there should be no hierarchy
among constitutional rights. This is an important assertion, for it
poses the chief rhetorical barrier to differentiating among claims
according to their impact on innocence. Rebuttal is essential to our
case, and requires separate consideration of two allied strands of
the argument: first, that the Constitution itself admits of no hier-
archy of rights; and second, that in any event the habeas corpus
statute does not permit differentiation among the rights to be
enforced.
The assertion that the Constitution admits of no ranking of
rights or values is commonly made,80 but deeply puzzling. In a
sense, all of modern constitutional law is to the contrary. The fa-
mous footnote four of Carolene Products is celebrated precisely
because it laid the foundation for a redirection of emphasis among
constitutional rights.8' Modern theorists do battle over the criteria
79 The Supreme Court has emphasized that, with rare exceptions, errors that clearly
did not affect the outcome of a criminal proceeding cannot justify reversal. See, for example,
Rose v Clark, 478 US 570, 579 (1986) ("The thrust of the many constitutional rules gov-
erning the conduct of criminal trials is to ensure that those trials lead to fair and correct
judgments. Where a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment
should be affirmed.").
For a recent, comprehensive effort to unravel the Court's harmless-error jurisprudence
(and also to suggest some changes), see Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless
Constitutional Error, 88 Colum L Rev 79 (1988).
80 See, for example, Friedman, 73 Minn L Rev at 320 (cited in note 19) ("ranking of
constitutional rights finds no basis in the habeas statute or the Constitution itself"); and
Stacy and Dayton, 88 Colum L Rev at 90 (cited in note 79) ("The Constitution does not
create a hierarchy of rights or values.").
81 United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938). There is a mas-
sive literature on Carolene Product's transformation of constitutional law. For some deserv-
edly famous discussions, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard, 1980);
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv L Rev 713 (1985).
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for constitutional adjudication, but all envision something other
than a featureless plane of undifferentiated rights. No one thinks
the Second Amendment is as important as the First, or that the
cumulation of precedent leaves the Tenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments effectively unranked. The "economic" and "personal" as-
pects of constitutionally protected "liberty" have been sharply dis-
tinguished; 12 the apparent exclusivity of Article III adjudication is
more hole than cheese;8" and the Commerce Clause has expanded
beyond recognition.84 Whatever may be said for or against these
decisions, they all proceed from the common ground that there is a
hierarchy among constitutional protections. The only sense in
which this is not true is the verbal sleight of hand that some rights
have been greatly expanded, while others have been defined away,
but that all rights, as reconstructed, have a sort of nominal equal-
ity. This fiction is too threadbare to require rebuttal.
The real point of the no-hierarchy-of-rights rhetoric, we be-
lieve, is not that differentiation among constitutional rights is in-
herently wrong, but that it is impermissible to introduce such dif-
ferentiation into the law of habeas corpus. The contention is that
rights that are vindicated on direct appeal must also prevail on
collateral review. Properly understood, this argument is not about
the nature of constitutional rights but about the scope of federal
habeas corpus.
Both commentators and Supreme Court justices have ob-
served that the federal habeas statute gives no textual warrant for
differentiating among constitutional rights.8 5 That is true. It is also
true that virtually all ingredients of federal habeas law were an-
nounced without statutory authority. At least since 1886, federal
habeas law has developed by judicial innovation, followed (some-
times) by legislative ratification. This is true of the exhaustion re-
SI Compare, for example, the deference paid to state rules that affect individuals' inter-
est in choosing their occupations, see Williamson v Lee Optical Co., 348 US 483 (1955), with
the exacting scrutiny paid to state regulation of personal associations, Moore v City of East
Cleveland, 431 US 494 (1977).
83 Northern Pipeline Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 US 50 (1982), may represent
the last bit of cheese.
For two examples of the limitless reach of the Clause, see Garcia v San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528 (1985); and Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111
(1942).
$5 See Stone v Powell, 428 US at 503-06, 515-33 (Brennan dissenting); J. Patrick Green,
Stone v. Powell: The Hermeneutics of the Burger Court, 10 Creighton L Rev 655 (1977);
and Mark Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory Analyses in the Law of Federal Jurisdic-
tion, 25 UCLA L Rev 1301, 1316-18 (1978).
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quirement, which was announced in 1886,86 codified in 1948,87 and
has been significantly modified since then."" It is also true of the
range of legal issues that, once heard in state court, could be reliti-
gated on federal habeas corpus. Decisions early in this century de-
fined a relatively narrow scope for relitigation (whether in accord
with congressional intent, we do not say).89 The range of such
claims cognizable on federal habeas review was expanded in Brown
v Allen90 and partly contracted in Stone v Powell,91 all without aid
of statutory intervention. Similarly, the scope of relitigation of the
facts underlying federal claims was first announced by decision 92
and only later codified by statute.9 s
Finally, and most to the point, judicial innovation has deter-
mined the scope of habeas review for defaulted claims. Whatever
one might say about the supposed original intent of the habeas
statute,94 federal habeas review of defaulted claims was at first
" Ex parte Royall, 117 US 241 (1886).
" Act of June 25, 1948, ch 646, 62 Stat 967 (1948), codified at 28 USC § 2254(b),(c)
(1982).
" See Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509 (1982).
89 This historical issue has occasioned a good deal of debate. The standard argument
that Congress intended the 1867 habeas statute to cover only jurisdictional claims is made
in Bator, 76 Harv L Rev at 463-77 (cited in note 53). For the argument that the statute was
meant to cover a much larger category of claims, see Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal
Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 Harv CR-CL L Rev 579, 603-63 (1982).
"o 344 US 443 (1953). Brown extended the scope of federal habeas to federal constitu-
tional claims generally, holding that it did not apply merely to claims bearing on the juris-
diction or authority of the relevant state court.
91 428 US 465. Stone barred relitigation of Fourth Amendment claims, save where the
defendant did not receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in state court.
12 Townsend v Sain, 372 US 293 (1963).
' Act of Nov 2, 1966, Pub L No 89-711, § 2, 80 Stat 1105 (1966), codified at 28 USC
§ 2254(d) (1982). Section 2254 requires a federal habeas court to defer to "a determination
after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court." Interestingly, the
statutory amendment departed from the Court's pronouncements in a way that, although
seemingly significant, was not given effect until the Court itself decided to constrict the
scope of factual relitigation. Sumner v Mata, 449 US 539 (1981), on review following re-
mand, 455 US 591 (1982) (per curiam), held that § 2254(d) applies when a state appellate
court made the factual findings, as well as when a trial court made the factual findings. In
Mata, the majority's ahistorical emphasis on statutory text had a constrictive rather than
expansive effect on the scope of the federal habeas remedy, perhaps explaining why the
approach has not received approval from all quarters. Compare Mata, 449 US at 544-49
(majority opinion undertaking a close text-bound construction of § 2254(d)) with id at 555-
59 (Brennan dissenting) (emphasizing prior Supreme Court decisions rather than the statu-
tory text).
" Compare Fay v Noia, 372 US 391, 399-415 (1963) (arguing from history for broadly
available habeas relief for defaulted claims) with id at 449-63 (Harlan dissenting) (arguing
from history for the opposite conclusion).
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completely foreclosed,"5 then substantially allowed,9 6 and later
partly restricted,97 all without statutory change. Indeed, the issue
is not now, and never has been, expressly resolved by statute.
Against this background, one can hardly insist on the primacy
of legislative innovation in the law of federal habeas corpus. To
put the matter bluntly, it is simply too late in the day to assert a
lack of judicial authority to reform habeas law. 8 No doubt the sep-
aration of powers argument, as it is sometimes called, is attractive
to one who is alarmed at the direction of judicial innovation, but
this kind of tactical response will not do. Judicial authority to ex-
pand habeas review necessarily implies the authority to restrict it
also. That, at least, is the view taken by the Supreme Court,99 and
we think it fairly meets the expectations in this field. At the very
least, it applies where, as here, prior decisions have not been
codified.
This is not to say that Congress could not override the Court's
decisions, nor that a genuine legislative command ought not be
respected. It is only to acknowledge that the pattern of statutory
amendment in this area has been merely to confirm judicially an-
nounced changes in the law. We suggest that this tradition should
be presumed to continue, unless and until Congress indicates its
dissatisfaction.
In short, there is nothing inherently wrong with differentiating
among constitutional rights, either directly or as a condition of
habeas review. The question is not whether such distinctions are in
principle permissible-surely they are-but whether they are wise.
In our view, it is wise to differentiate among constitutional claims
according to whether they raise a "reasonable possibility" of factu-
ally erroneous conviction (or factually unsupported sentence of
death), at least when these claims were defaulted in state court.
This approach would, in most cases, respect the states' interests in
finality of judgments and in enforcing legitimate procedural re-
quirements. At the same time, it would vindicate the overriding
95 Brown v Allen, 344 US 443 (1953).
9" Fay, 372 US 391.
97 Sykes, 433 US 72; Carrier, 477 US 478.
93 David Shapiro has argued that this proposition extends well beyond federal habeas:
that the exercise of judicial discretion is a proper and useful part of defining the bounds of
federal jurisdiction as a general matter. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion,
60 NYU L Rev 543 (1985).
9 See Sykes, 433 US at 81 (analysis of Court's habeas decisions "illustrates this Court's
historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even
where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged.").
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federal interest in hearing federal claims suggesting unjust convic-
tion or punishment. The federal interest would be addressed di-
rectly, without the deflective intermediate step of categorizing rea-
sons for the default. Defaulted federal claims that do not arguably
demonstrate innocence (or unjustified sentence of death) would
not be heard on habeas corpus, simply because there is no compel-
ling reason to do so.
4. Attorney ineffectiveness and pervasive neglect.
Paradoxically, review of non-guilt-related defaulted claims
might be thought necessary to protect innocence. One could argue
that a defense attorney's incompetent handling of an issue signals
possible incompetence in other areas-including matters not
known to the court or, for that matter, to the defendant. This
point suggests that even if the law were concerned solely with
preventing unjust convictions, attorney ineffectiveness could be a
useful tool for determining which convictions are unjust. Indeed,
the Strickland Court suggested as much, in the course of explain-
ing why it was not adopting an even more stringent prejudice stan-
dard than reasonable probability. 100
The idea of attorney error as a sign of pervasive neglect im-
plies that claims of the sort raised in Kimmelman must be heard
not because those claims themselves suggest injustice, but because
the underlying attorney errors do. One might say that in Kim-
melman, for example, the defense attorney's failure to move to
suppress the bedsheet calls into question the competence of the
rest of his representation. Perhaps, the argument goes, Neil Morri-
son was not really guilty, but was convicted only because an attor-
ney foolish enough not to file a suppression motion was also suffi-
ciently inept to botch an available factual defense. 10'
This point has some rough plausibility. It is a familiar idea
that one instance of misconduct may be evidence of other undis-
covered misconduct, and this proposition surely holds true of pro-
fessional incompetence. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to
weigh this chain of inferences too heavily. The fact that errors
100 See Strickland, 466 US at 694 (rejecting the more-probable-than-not outcome deter-
minative standard used for newly-discovered evidence claims, and noting that "[a]n ineffec-
tive assistance claim asserta the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of
the proceeding is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and the appropriate
standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower").
101 See Strickland, 466 US at 710 (Marshall dissenting); and Berger, 86 Colum L Rev at
92-93 (cited in note 20). This, of course, is the accuracy-based argument for the performance
prong.
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sometimes come in bunches does not change the fact that they
often come alone. More importantly, the signaling argument re-
quires simultaneous acceptance of three propositions: that the er-
ror in question indicates a substantial likelihood of other errors;
that those other errors bear on the defendant's guilt or innocence;
and that those other errors are undiscoverable. For if errors that
suggest injustice are uncovered, they can support a claim directly,
making it unnecessary to use non-guilt-related errors as a marker
for pervasive incompetence. We think it likely that Kimmelman-
type mistakes coexist only rarely with other, undiscoverable errors
that result in the conviction of innocent defendants.
This conclusion is reinforced by another aspect of ineffective
assistance doctrine. In United States v Cronic, the Court held that
truly pervasive neglect by counsel (or action by the government
that pervasively prevented counsel from doing his or her job) re-
quires reversal without any showing of prejudice. 102 Although the
Court discussed pervasive neglect in the context of a claim that
defense counsel lacked adequate time to prepare the case, there is
no reason why Cronic should be limited to that context. When a
defense attorney makes a series of mistakes rather than an isolated
error, the inference of pervasive neglect is much stronger. Accord-
ingly, when a defense attorney has made a series of clear misjudg-
ments, the case should be treated as one where the possibility of
injustice is high regardless of the nature of the attorney's mis-
takes. This would require some expansion of Cronic's scope, but
the expansion seems wholly appropriate. 08 In short, Cronic imple-
ments the signaling insight by allowing for relief when there is rea-
son to believe that counsel did many things badly. Given the
Cronic remedy, it seems excessive to assume pervasive neglect
based only on evidence of one discrete attorney mistake, even if
the error was serious.
102 466 US 648, 657-62 (1984) (prejudice may be presumed when there has been "a
breakdown in the adversarial process that would justify a presumption that [the defend-
ant's] conviction was insufficiently reliable to satisfy the Constitution").
103 Lower courts have generally assumed that Cronic applies to pervasive defense attor-
ney neglect, and not simply to excessive constraints placed on defense counsel by the gov-
eminent. See LaFave and Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 11.10(a) at 39 n 22.8, § 11.10(d) at
51 n 76.10 (Supp 1989) (cited in note 39). At the same time, the lower courts have defined
pervasive neglect very narrowly. Id. If the courts reduced the number of Strickland claims
by defining prejudice in guilt-related terms, they could expand the scope of Cronic by defin-
ing pervasive neglect to include all cases with a large number of serious attorney errors.
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III. DEFINING AND APPLYING A GUILT-RELATED PREJUDICE
STANDARD
We have suggested that the law of defaulted claims should be
radically simplified by limiting relief to cases where the defendant
can show that the default created a reasonable possibility of an
unjust result. What that standard would mean in practice depends
on how it is applied. In particular, any rule for defaulted claims
must take account of the different categories of constitutional rules
at issue in federal habeas. Some constitutional claims are wholly
unrelated to guilt. Others clearly bear on the accuracy of the de-
fendant's conviction. A third category of claims invoke constitu-
tional rules that enhance the accuracy of criminal adjudications
generally, but have an indeterminate effect on any particular case.
Finally, an increasing number of federal habeas petitions challenge
death sentences rather than criminal convictions. These different
types of constitutional claims raise different issues of habeas ad-
ministration, and complicate the definition and application of any
rule for defaulted claims. What follows is an attempt to deal with
these differences in a way that is consistent with a focus on
preventing unjust outcomes, but that avoids the complexity of the
Court's defaulted claims jurisprudence.
To explain how our proposed standard might work in practice,
we apply it to four of the Court's recent procedural default deci-
sions, representing the four kinds of federal constitutional claims
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Kimmelman v Morrison in-
volved a Fourth Amendment claim unrelated to the defendant's
guilt. The defendant in Murray v Carrier raised a due process
claim that went directly to the accuracy of his conviction. Teague v
Lane offers an example of a systemic accuracy-enhancing rule that
may or may not have affected the outcome in that particular case.
Finally, Dugger v Adams involved an Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge to the defendant's death sentence.
A. Non-Guilt-Related Claims: Kimmelman v Morrison'"
Kimmelman, for us, is an easy case. The defendant had a
plausible claim that the bedsheet introduced in his rape trial had
been illegally seized. Defense counsel did not object to the evi-
dence in a timely fashion. The evidence was therefore admitted,
and the defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court found that
104 477 US 365 (1986).
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the lawyer's error could show ineffective assistance of counsel,
which would support federal habeas review of the defaulted Fourth
Amendment claim.
Under our approach, the defaulted claim would not be re-
opened. Whatever the character of the lawyer's error, there is no
chance that the failure to ask for suppression impaired the accu-
racy of the conviction. On the contrary, the admission of relevant,
non-misleading physical evidence could only have enhanced the ac-
curacy of the outcome, however unwelcome that effect may have
been to a guilty defendant. We therefore would have denied habeas
review, unless it could have been shown that the lawyer's error was
not an isolated default, but rather part of a larger pattern of in-
competence that undermined the reliability of the defendant's
conviction.
It is perhaps conceivable that an isolated error could be so ex-
travagant as to call into question the lawyer's ability to do any-
thing else correctly, but we think that kind of loose inference
should prevail, if at all, only in extraordinary cases. Generally
speaking, pervasive incompetence should require proof of more
than an isolated mistake-particularly where, as in Kimmelman,
counsel's error seems to have actually increased the reliability of
the guilt determination.
The same result would follow in virtually every case of a de-
faulted Fourth Amendment claim. We think that entirely proper.
We also note that our approach has the advantage (others will view
it differently) of aligning the Sykes standard for review of de-
faulted claims with the Stone v Powell limitation of habeas review
of litigated claims. It is an indictment of current law that these
two channels for federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment
claims are unaccountably divergent. We see no reason for the dis-
parity and would extend the policy of Stone v Powell to defaulted
as well as litigated claims, so long as there was a full and fair op-
portunity to raise the claim in state court.
B. Guilt-Related Claims: Murray v Carrier0 "
Prior to Carrier's trial for rape and abduction, his lawyer
sought to discover the victim's statements to the police. The trial
judge examined the statements in camera, concluded that none
was exculpatory, and denied discovery. This was almost surely er-
ror, since, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurrence, "the
105 477 US 478 (1986).
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conclusion that there was no 'exculpatory' material in the victim's
statements does not foreclose the possibility that inconsistencies
between the statements and the direct testimony would have ena-
bled an effective cross-examination to demonstrate that [Carrier]
is actually innocent."10 6 In an apparent oversight, Carrier's lawyer
failed to include the discovery claim in his petition for appeal,
thereby defaulting the claim under state law. The Supreme Court
concluded that (1) the Sykes cause-and-prejudice test applies to
procedural defaults on appeal as well as at trial,0 7 and (2) non-
ineffective lawyer error was not "cause" for a procedural default.10 8
(The Court also said that ineffective assistance would constitute
"cause," but that this claim should be exhausted in state court
before federal habeas review.) 10 9 Since Carrier did not claim that
the lawyer's oversight amounted to ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, the default was conclusive.
Our approach to this case would be more direct. We would ask
only if there was a "reasonable possibility" that the failure to make
the victim's statements available to defense counsel resulted in the
conviction of one who was factually innocent. Answering that ques-
tion would require an analysis of the statements Carrier sought to
discover, together with the victim's testimony at Carrier's trial, to
determine whether the course of the trial plausibly could have
been different had defense counsel known the contents of the
statements. We have not examined the record, and cannot say
what conclusion that analysis would yield. But we are confident
that it focuses on the right question.
This approach should not be especially burdensome for federal
habeas courts. Indeed, courts should find our analysis natural,
since it is precisely the analysis that governs the merits of Carrier's
claim. Carrier's claim is that the government failed to disclose ma-
terial exculpatory evidence. Under a line of cases governing prose-
cutors' duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, a defendant is enti-
tled to have his conviction overturned if the nondisclosure of such
evidence created a reasonable probability of an effect on the out-
come. 110 Satisfying this standard would necessarily satisfy our pro-
posed prejudice standard. Thus, under our approach, Carrier's
10 Id at 499 (Stevens concurring).
107 Id at 490-92 (majority opinion).
'08 Id at 485-88.
100 Id at 488-89.
110 See United States v Bagley, 473 US 667 (1985); United States v Agurs, 427 US 97
(1976); and Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963).
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claim should be granted if it is a valid claim on the merits, and not
otherwise. The presence or absence of "cause"-the issue that
dominated forty-five pages in the United States Reports-would
be irrelevant.
Our approach is similar to, but a good deal simpler than, that
offered by Justice Stevens in his separate opinion in Carrier."'
Stevens argued that the focus should be on "prejudice" rather than
on "cause" whenever the claim relates to fundamental fairness, a
category that, for Stevens, would extend beyond guilt-related-
ness.11 2 Otherwise, apparently, the ordinary cause and prejudice
test would apply. Additionally, in cases where the claim does relate
to fundamental fairness, Stevens apparently would require a fed-
eral habeas court to balance the interests protected by the claim
against the state's interest in enforcing the relevant procedural
rule."' It is not clear how courts are supposed to balance such in-
commensurate interests in specific cases, and we think the inquiry
is in any event unnecessary. It would be sufficient-and a good
deal easier-to ask directly whether Carrier had shown a "reasona-
ble possibility" of a factually unreliable conviction and there let
the matter rest.
C. Claims Involving Systemic Accuracy-Enhancing Rules:
Teague v Lane"4
Teague, a black man, was convicted of attempted murder,
armed robbery, and aggravated battery by an all-white jury. The
prosecutor had obtained the all-white jury by using all ten of his
peremptory challenges against blacks. Teague's lawyer objected on
the ground that this process violated the Sixth Amendment re-
quirement that the jury represent a fair cross-section of the com-
munity; this objection was overruled. On federal habeas corpus,
Teague pressed three related claims: (1) that the prosecutor vio-
lated Batson v Kentucky," 5 which announced, after Teague's trial,
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited (at least in some cir-
cumstances) the race-based use of peremptory challenges; (2) that
the prosecutor also violated the more lax pre-Batson equal protec-
1 477 US at 497-516 (Stevens concurring).
u12 See Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509, 543-44 (1982) (Stevens dissenting).
110 See Carrier, 477 US at 506 (Stevens concurring) ("An inquiry into the requirements
of justice requires a consideration, not only of the nature and strength of the constitutional
claim, but also of the nature and strength of the state procedural rule that has not been
observed.").
114 109 S Ct 1060 (1989).
225 476 US 79 (1986).
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tion standard of Swain v Alabama;'16 and (3) that the prosecutor
violated the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement.
The Court's resolution of these claims illustrates the excessive
proceduralization of habeas review. Each theory was rejected for a
different reason, none of which addressed the merits of the rele-
vant claim. First, the Batson argument was rejected on the ground
that, as the Court had held previously, 117 Batson did not apply to
convictions that had become final before the decision was an-
nounced. Second, the Swain claim was rejected because it had
been defaulted: Teague's lawyer had not raised the equal protec-
tion argument at trial or on direct appeal. Finally, and most im-
portantly, the fair cross-section claim was rejected because it re-
quired a departure from existing Sixth Amendment doctrine. A
plurality of the Court declared that new rules of that sort"' could
not be applied retroactively on federal habeas corpus. The plural-
ity concluded that the new rule sought by Teague could be ap-
proved only if other litigants in his position would also enjoy its
benefit. Since a new Sixth Amendment requirement governing per-
emptory challenges would not apply retroactively on federal
habeas corpus (as in Batson), neither could it be announced on
federal habeas corpus." 9 In other words, the Court concluded that
even if Teague's Sixth Amendment claim was valid, he could not
get the benefit of it on federal habeas corpus. The Court thus de-
nied all three related claims without reaching the merits of any of
them.
Teague provides wonderful fodder for law school exam ques-
tions, but it only complicates the administration of habeas corpus.
The retroactivity tangle that dominated the opinion and the proce-
I's 380 US 202 (1965). Under Swain, defendants had to prove, in essence, a pattern of
race-based peremptory challenges unrelated to the nature of the case or the defendant. See
id at 223-24 (describing the kind of evidence that would give rise to an inference of pur-
poseful discrimination). A defendant could not make out an equal protection claim based
solely on the prosecutor's decision to strike members of the defendant's race in the defen-
dant's case.
117 See Allen v Hardy, 478 US 255 (1986) (per curiam).
118 A different result might have been reached had the new rule concerned a procedure
"without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." 109 S Ct at
1076-77.
119 The retroactivity analysis was announced in a plurality opinion by Justice
O'Connor, joined on this point by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Jus-
tice White did not join this portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion, although his separate
opinion does not disagree with the plurality's analysis or result. See id at 1078-79 (White
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In any event, a majority of the Court
later adopted Teague's retroactivity analysis and applied it to rules governing the imposi-
tion of capital punishment. See Penry v Lynaugh, 109 S Ct 2934, 2944-47 (1989).
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dural bar doctrine that precluded the Swain claim share a common
objective. Both are designed to allow relief in cases of injustice, but
otherwise to avoid wholesale collateral review of federal claims.1 20
Teague illustrates the complexities of an essentially procedural ap-
proach to this objective. Yet the issue is not so difficult if ap-
proached directly.
We would ask simply whether the prosecutor's conduct in
striking blacks from the jury raised a "reasonable possibility" of a
factually unreliable conviction. Quite possibly, such a showing
could be made. The race-based use of peremptory challenges would
tend to undermine the accuracy of determinations of guilt, at least
in close cases. Thus, in a general way, the Batson rule is designed
to secure just outcomes, not merely to deter misconduct that is
otherwise objectionable.121 The force of this point is amplified
when one remembers that the accuracy of conviction concerns not
merely the fact, but also the grade, of criminal liability. Even if it
were clear beyond doubt that Teague was guilty of some form of
assaultive behavior, the jury may have had room for judgment as
to the appropriate grade of criminal liability.12 2 Accordingly, we
think it likely that Teague could have shown a "reasonable possi-
bility" of factual error, and, in any event, that this is the right bat-
tleground. If such error could be shown, it is simply intolerable not
to grant relief.
Having said that, we add that cases like Teague raise difficult
administrative issues: they involve protections that promote accu-
racy in a systemic sense, yet do not necessarily affect accuracy in
any particular case. In other words, the fact that the Batson rule
was designed in part to promote accuracy does not mean that
every violation of that rule creates a significant risk of an inaccu-
rate judgment. The task is to find a mechanism for separating
those cases in which the jury selection might have led to an unjust
conviction from those cases in which any jury would have con-
victed. That is precisely what the Court's approach, focusing on
110 On the role of retroactivity in protecting against basic injustice, see Penry, 109 S Ct
at 2952-53; and Teague, 109 S Ct at 1076-77. On the role of habeas review of defaulted
claims in serving the same goal, see Sykes, 433 US at 90-91.
"' See Allen v Hardy, 478 US 255, 259 (1986) (accuracy of results is one justification
for the Batson rule).
"' Teague was found guilty of three counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed
robbery, and one count of aggravated battery. The court entered judgment only on the at-
tempted murder and armed robbery counts, sentencing him to thirty years' imprisonment
on each count. People v Teague, 108 Ill App 3d 891, 439 NE2d 1066, 1068 (1982).
Teague's lawyer sought an instruction for lesser included offenses at trial, but the trial
court refused. That decision was upheld on appeal. 439 NE2d at 1076-77.
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retroactivity, does not do. Retroactivity analysis inevitably has an
all-or-nothing character; either everyone with Teague's claim will
receive a new trial or no one will. Since the number of cases at
stake is large, and the number of potential injustices a good deal
smaller, the Court predictably has decided that the costs of blan-
ket reversal are too high. Those costs are a good deal more beara-
ble, however,' if one aims to distinguish worthy from unworthy
claimants.
The only solution is to look at the record to see whether the
case was close on the merits. If the evidence against Teague was
overwhelming, he should not get relief. On the other hand, if a rea-
sonable jury could have acquitted (and if no inadmissible evidence
clearly established guilt), he should get relief, for the very sort of
bias that Batson aimed to prevent might have caused an unjust
conviction. In other words, a viable Batson claim should entitle
Teague to greater-than-usual scrutiny of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence against him, but not to automatic reversal.
This approach makes it unnecessary to consider either
Teague's Swain claim or his fair cross-section claim. Teague could
thus obtain the benefit of his most clearly meritorious legal theory
(and courts could avoid his more controversial claims), because the
prejudice standard sufficiently limits the universe of possible
claims.
Our approach also makes the retroactivity analysis that lay at
the heart of Teague unnecessary. This is no small benefit. The
most recent term of the Supreme Court suggests that retroactivity
is likely to become the newest, and perhaps the messiest, proce-
dural thicket to trip up habeas courts. Deciding retroactivity under
the Court's analysis requires a federal court to determine both (1)
whether the defendant's claim requires adoption of a "new rule" or
merely application of existing law,123 and if the former, (2) whether
the new rule is one "without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished."' 24 Each of these issues is com-
plicated and hard. Many arguments involve some marginal altera-
tions of existing law, and no one knows when such arguments seek
"new rules" and when they do not. And many constitutional rules
protect innocent defendants sometimes, yet do not necessarily pro-
tect innocence in any particular case. An approach that looks di-
rectly to the merits avoids both of these categorization problems.
And although retroactivity analysis extends beyond defaulted
123 See Butler v McKellar, 110 S Ct 1212, 1216-18 (1990).
124 Teague, 109 S Ct at 1076-77; see also Saffle v Parks, 110 S Ct 1257, 1263-64 (1990).
[57:679
1990] Reforming Habeas Corpus
claims, we suspect that a substantial portion of the cases that raise
retroactivity issues will, like Teague itself, involve efforts by coun-
sel to excuse a procedural default by pointing to new law. Making
such claims easier to decide would go far toward untying the proce-
dural knot Teague has created.12 5
D. Challenges to Death Sentences: Dugger v Adams 2 6
Adams was convicted of murdering an eight-year-old girl in
1978. At his capital sentencing proceeding, the trial judge repeat-
edly told the jury that its recommendation would be advisory only
and that the court had ultimate responsibility for fixing the sen-
tence. These instructions were improper under state law because
the jury's recommendation enjoyed a presumption of correctness
and could be overturned only on clear and convincing evidence of
error, but the defense counsel did not object. The jury recom-
mended death, and the court imposed this sentence.
On federal habeas corpus, Adams argued that the judge's in-
struction violated Caldwell v Mississippi,' a 1985 decision hold-
ing that the Eighth Amendment requires that juries not be misled
about their role (as set by state law) in imposing death sentences.
Adams won in the lower courts, but the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court found that, even though Caldwell had not been decided
at the time of Adams's sentencing, his claim was barred by his law-
125 Eliminating retroactivity analysis is useful generally, but particularly so in cases
(unlike Teague) where the prejudice issue is easy. For example, in Butler v McKellar, 110 S
Ct 1212 (1990), the defendant declined to talk to the police and asked to see a lawyer when
police questioned him about an assault charge. The next day, officers gave him Miranda
warnings, and, with the defendant's permission, proceeded to question him about a then-
unsolved murder. He made several incriminating statements, all of which were concededly
voluntary and reliable. 110 S Ct at 1214-15. The defendant argued, correctly, that these
statements were obtained in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v Rober-
son, 486 US 675 (1988), which held that police may not question a defendant who has in-
voked his right to counsel, even if the questioning concerns a different crime. Roberson was
decided long after Butler's conviction became final. In a detailed and controversial applica-
tion of Teague, the Court found that Roberson had created a "new rule," and was not
merely an application of existing law. 110 S Ct at 1216-18. Consequently, the Court held,
Roberson could not be applied retroactively to Butler's case.
Butler's claim was not defaulted. Had it been, the Court's analysis would have been
even more complicated: the Court would have had to consider whether Roberson created the
type of new rule that satisfies Sykes "cause." See notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
There is a much simpler way to resolve cases of this sort. Butler's claim resembles the
claim in Kimmelman v Morrison, since it aims to suppress concededly reliable evidence of
guilt. Thus, the claim cannot possibly raise any serious doubt about the fairness of Butler's
conviction. At least if the claim were defaulted, we would deny relief on that ground alone.
226 109 S Ct 1211 (1989).
127 472 US 320 (1985).
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yer's failure to object to the instruction. The reasoning behind this
conclusion is a little complex. A Caldwell Eighth Amendment
claim logically requires a violation of state law. If the instructions
accurately state the role assigned to the jury by state law in capital
sentencing proceedings, there is no Eighth Amendment violation.
Even though Caldwell was decided later, the Court concluded that
the underlying error of state law should have been recognized at
the time of Adams's sentencing. Therefore, the Court concluded,
the lawyer's failure to raise the state law claim barred federal
habeas review of the associated Eighth Amendment claim.
In one sense, Adams's claim closely resembles Teague's. Both
involve systemic rules that enhance the accuracy of jury decision-
making. The two cases are different, however, because of the dif-
ference between capital sentencing proceedings and more ordinary
criminal adjudications. Given the judgmental and evaluative char-
acter of the criteria used to sentence Adams to death,12 s we think
it very likely that Adams could have shown a "reasonable possibil-
ity" of error, though that ultimately would depend on the
evidence.
The point can be generalized. Our approach is broadly forgiv-
ing of procedural defaults concerning the sentencing stage of capi-
tal proceedings. The reason is not primarily that the death penalty
is special, although that may be thought sufficient. The reason is
that the statutory and constitutional criteria governing the death
sentence involve irreducible elements of subjectivity and discre-
tion. 29 Where that is so, the concept of factual reliability loses its
128 The trial judge, in upholding the jury's recommendation of death, found three ag-
gravating and three mitigating circumstances. The aggravating circumstances were (1) that
the murder was committed in the course of a rape and/or kidnapping, (2) that it was com-
mitted for the purpose of preventing arrest, and (3) that it was "especially heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel." Adams v State, 412 S2d 850, 854 (Fla 1982). The mitigating factors were (1)
that Adams had no significant prior criminal history, (2) that he was "under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance," and (3) that he was only 20 years of age at the
time of the crime. Id. The third aggravating factor, the first two mitigating factors, and the
ultimate recommendation call for evaluative judgments that differ appreciably from those
required at the guilt-innocence phase of most criminal proceedings. And a jury that knows it
will probably have the final say on such issues may react very differently from one that
thinks it is merely offering advice to the trial court.
129 This is due partly to the nature of the beast, see McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279
(1987) (rejecting an elaborate statistical challenge to Georgia's imposition of the death pen-
alty and emphasizing the role of individualized discretion in imposing the death sentence),
and partly to the Supreme Court's disapproval of a more categorical approach. See, for ex-
ample, Eddings v Oklahoma, 455 US 104 (1982) (holding that sentencing juries and judges
must consider individual mitigating circumstances); and Sumner v Shuman, 483 US 66
(1987) (rejecting mandatory death sentences for murders committed by those serving life
terms).
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clarity and hardness. To the extent that the determination is
overtly evaluative and judgmental, any defaulted claim that is not
constitutionally harmless would have a "reasonable possibility" of
affecting the reliability of the sentence of death.
Of course, that is not inevitably so. The defaulted claim might
concern an issue that is no more indeterminate and judgmental
than the factual conclusions that typically underlie a guilty ver-
dict. But in general, the concept of "reasonable possibility" of fac-
tual error would have a broader reach in capital cases because of
the broader range of facts relevant to the imposition of a capital
sentence. In other words, for defaulted claims with respect to
death sentences, we would expect the difference between an
outcome-based construction of "prejudice" and one oriented to-
ward the factual reliability of the underlying findings to be rela-
tively insignificant. Both standards are likely to converge on the
traditional concept of harmless error.
Though our approach is generally favorable to capital defen-
dants, it would not aggravate the problem that seems to bother
some of the Justices-the long, drawn-out nature of litigation in
capital cases. That problem arises not from defaulted claims, but
from repetitious habeas petitions. Any legal change that would en-
courage defendants to collapse all possible claims into one habeas
petition, and thereby allow courts to resolve all merits issues at
once, would reduce that problem. We think that that is exactly the
effect of our proposal, since it would tend to lead directly to a mer-
its decision on all available claims.
IV. SOME BROADER IMPLICATIONS
Our discussion of procedurally defaulted claims is now at an
end. The argument need not be carried further, as it is possible to
simplify and, we think, to improve the law of defaulted claims
without affecting the rest of the habeas landscape. At the same
time, our argument does cast a shadow on at least two other im-
portant habeas issues: (1) the proper standards for purely factual
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (2) the proper stan-
dards for claims of constitutionally insufficient evidence. We do
not treat these issues exhaustively, because the concerns they raise
are different from those raised by defaulted claims and merit fuller
treatment than is possible here. What follows is therefore brief and
somewhat speculative.
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A. Factual Ineffective Assistance Claims
Most ineffective assistance claims are not based on the defense
counsel's failure to raise a federal claim or defense. More com-
monly, the allegation of ineffectiveness concerns a decision that af-
fected the development of the facts-for example, failure to offer
an alibi or character witness or to uncover and present other excul-
patory evidence. Such cases are in some ways like the allegation of
ineffectiveness based on defaults of federal claims. In both in-
stances, the defendant argues that, through no fault of his own,
some claim or evidence was not properly presented. The law of de-
faulted claims seeks to sift through such arguments to identify in-
justices that require habeas relief. In our view, ineffective assis-
tance doctrine should have the same aim in factual error cases.
This last step is quite controversial. The conventional wisdom,
among both judges and academics, is that a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel goes not to the substance of the conviction,
but to the process by which it was obtained.130 Consequently, the
argument goes, such claims should be granted regardless of the na-
ture of the attorney error in question-essentially the position
adopted in Kimmelman v Morrison.
In our view, this process-oriented approach to ineffectiveness
is flawed for the same reasons that argue against federal habeas
review of defaulted Fourth Amendment claims. Consider, for ex-
ample, a defendant who tells his lawyer that he wants to testify on
his own behalf. The lawyer responds with a simple, "Fine with
me," and neither dissuades the defendant from testifying nor
warns him of the attendant risks. The defendant then takes the
stand and testifies that he was in another place at the time of the
crime. On cross-examination the prosecutor shreds his story, forc-
ing him to admit that his direct testimony was false. Predictably,
the jury convicts.
Even if the defense counsel made no other error, one could
argue that the defendant was convicted in part because of his law-
yer's incompetence in failing to make him aware of the risks of
130 See, for example, LaFave and Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 11.10 at 50 (Supp
1989) (cited in note 39)(criticizing the argument that ineffective assistance doctrine should
focus exclusively on outcome effects that bear on the defendant's guilt); Berger, 86 Colum L
Rev at 94 (cited in note 20)(arguing that the "prejudice" prong of Strickland should be
abandoned because the constitutional protection concerns the process of effective represen-
tation, without regard to its effects); and Goodpaster, 14 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 68-70
(cited in note 20)(arguing that ineffective assistance doctrine must protect the entire pro-
cess, not merely determination of guilt, on the ground that the adversary system serves
multiple functions).
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waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege. Yet, even assuming that
incompetence can be shown, it is not so clear why relief should be
granted. The defendant fared worse than he might have, in that a
better lawyer might have gotten him off, but the error does not
cast doubt on the reliability of the determination of guilt. The
problem here seems to us very much like the situation in Kim-
melman, and our response might well be the same.131
One is left with the argument that this hypothetical defendant
should get relief on the ground that effective assistance of counsel
is not an aid to accurate results but an end in itself. This proposi-
tion may be the implicit premise of those who maintain that guilt
and innocence should be irrelevant to assessing ineffectiveness. But
it is hard to see why counsel should be viewed as an end rather
than a means. Counsel, after all, is part of a larger adjudicative
process, and the entire process is short-circuited whenever the de-
fendant pleads guilty. The fact that this happens in the majority of
cases 13 2 suggests that our attachment to the process as an end in
itself is, at best, half-hearted. Unless disposition of criminal prose-
cution by guilty plea is necessarily and inherently wrong, 33 it is
hard to escape the conclusion that the trial process-including ef-
fective assistance of counsel-is a tool for reaching right results
and not an end in itself.
On that view, factual ineffectiveness claims present a classic ex
ante/ex post problem. Ex ante, adequate representation across the
board is required so that innocent defendants (or merely arguably
231 One might argue that the defendant should have a viable Fifth Amendment claim
on the ground that his waiver was not sufficiently "knowing" and "intelligent." This argu-
ment is a hard one to make out, however, given that defendants regularly waive the privilege
without legal advice of any sort in the police station, and such waivers are not thought to
raise constitutional problems. See, for example, Moran v Burbine, 475 US 612 (1986). Nor
can one distinguish police station waivers from courtroom waivers based on their practical
consequences: the likeliest consequence of a confession in the police station, as in the court-
room, is conviction. For the classic exposition of this point, see Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice
in the Gatehouses and Mansions of Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, from Es-
cobedo to .... in A.E. Dick Howard, ed, Criminal Justice in Our Time 1, 9-25 (U Virginia,
1965).
131 Estimates vary, but all agree that more than half of all prosecutions are resolved by
guilty pleas. See, for example, Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave, and Jerold H. Israel, Mod-
ern Criminal Procedure 17 (West, 7th ed 1990) (estimating that guilty pleas dispose of 70-
90 percent of felony cases not dismissed); and Michael 0. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis
of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 Harv L Rev 293, 313 (1975) (reporting
guilty plea data from selected federal districts from 1970-74 which show that more than half
of all cases not dismissed were terminated by guilty pleas).
.* " That is, apart from inducements offered by the government to secure the plea.
Many persons think that plea bargaining is normatively unacceptable, but few assert that
disposition by plea is itself unacceptable.
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innocent defendants) can successfully defend the charges against
them. In other words, one cannot deny counsel to guilty defen-
dants while granting counsel to innocent ones, because it is impos-
sible to tell them apart in advance of trial. Ex post, however, it is
sometimes possible to separate cases where lawyer error raises a
"reasonable possibility" of injustice from cases where it does not.
The defendant whose lawyer failed to prevent the client's false
(and damning) testimony falls into the latter category. Arguably,
relief should not be granted in such a case.
In short, the argument for applying a unitary innocence-
related prejudice standard in this context is the same as the argu-
ment for applying such a standard to defaulted claims. If the law's
goal is to respect the states' interests in finality by denying relief in
most cases, while correcting cases of real injustice, the courts
should focus directly on the risk of injustice when deciding
whether to grant relief. That is why we have proposed a simple
prejudice test for defaulted claims. The same reasoning applies to
other attorney errors as well. If an alibi witness suggests that the
defendant may-be innocent, the defendant deserves relief no mat-
ter how negligent or reasonable was his attorney's decision not to
call that witness. By the same token, if the witness's testimony
shows nothing of consequence, it should make no difference
whether, given the information available to counsel at the time, the
decision not to call the witness was or was not grossly negligent. If
preventing unjust punishment is the goal, an innocence-related
prejudice standard is both a necessary and sufficient means of
achieving it.
Yet simply abolishing the performance prong of Strickland for
all cases would raise serious practical problems. Anytime a crimi-
nal defendant loses his case at trial, he can point to a long list of
evidentiary decisions by counsel that could have been made differ-
ently. Every choice to investigate (or not investigate) a defense or
argument, to interview (or not interview) a potential witness, or to
ask (or not ask) a question at trial can be second-guessed. A sound
ineffective assistance doctrine must weed out the mass of such
claims, yet preserve relief for those defendants who most deserve
it. The system cannot afford to examine closely the impact of the
lawyer's every action on the factual record.
Unfortunately, the screening process is a good deal harder in
cases of factual error than in cases involving defaulted claims.
First, while the list of legally plausible defaulted claims in any
given case must be fairly short, the list of evidentiary decisions is
very long indeed. Second, a large portion (probably a majority) of
[57:679
Reforming Habeas Corpus
defaulted claims can quickly be categorized as irrelevant to the jus-
tice of the defendant's conviction. That is because many constitu-
tional claims-including virtually all Fourth and Fifth Amendment
claims-do not bear on the question whether the defendant in fact
committed the crime charged.
Factual errors by defense counsel are different. Most eviden-
tiary decisions by lawyers do bear on guilt or innocence, for the
simple reason that only evidence relevant to that issue can be in-
troduced at trial. For every criminal trial that generates a convic-
tion, the defendant can point to a host of evidentiary decisions by
his lawyer that, with hindsight, might conceivably have affected
the accuracy of the guilty verdict.
One can plausibly defend the performance prong as a conve-
nient device for screening such claims. It may be easier to dispose
quickly of many ineffective assistance claims on the ground that
the attorney decisions at issue were within the range of competent
lawyering than to look into the likelihood that the relevant deci-
sions undermine one's faith in the outcomes. (But perhaps not; the
answer is not obvious.) Note, however, what that rationale implies
about the purpose of the inquiry into attorney performance. That
inquiry may be useful, but not because attorney performance is
particularly important in itself. Instead, the performance prong
makes sense, if at all, as a rough proxy for prejudice-that is, as a
way of screening out those cases where a prejudice inquiry would
be costly, and in any event would probably result in a denial of
relief.
No such proxy is needed in cases of defaulted claims, and for
those cases the performance prong therefore should be discarded.
Indeed, a separate doctrine of ineffective assistance is unnecessary
in that context; a single doctrine for procedural defaults should
suffice. Whether the proxy is useful in purely factual cases depends
on whether it is an effective proxy-whether a focus on lawyer per-
formance reaches substantially the same results as would a focus
on prejudice. That is a hard question. But even if the performance
prong should remain intact, it is worthwhile to focus judicial atten-
tion on that prong's ultimate purpose of promoting fair outcomes,
and not on process for process's sake.
B. Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Claims
Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review raises the question of how
far the system should (or can) go to protect innocence. Since we
have argued for innocence-protective review in the context of de-
faulted claims, one might fairly ask how we would apply our ap-
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proach when a claim of innocence is not tied to any direct claim of
constitutional error.
Consider two cases. In the first, the defendant seeks to compel
the government to disclose certain witness statements prior to
trial, on the ground that the statements might suggest that some-
one other than the defendant committed the crime in question.
The trial court, after reviewing the witness statements, denies the
defendant's motion, and the defendant is convicted. The defendant
fails to raise the discovery claim on direct appeal, thus triggering a
state-law procedural bar. On federal habeas, he seeks to resurrect
the discovery claim, and the habeas court concludes that had the
evidence in question been disclosed, the defendant reasonably
might have been acquitted. If the court were to apply our proposed
standard, it would vacate the conviction and order a new trial. 34
In the second case, the trial court decides in advance of trial,
correctly, that the evidence must be disclosed. Defense counsel
then uses the witness statements skillfully at trial, marshalling the
evidence to show that the government may have prosecuted the
wrong person. Inexplicably, the jury convicts. The trial court de-
nies the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and the convic-
tion is affirmed on appeal. On federal habeas, the defendant argues
not that his trial or appeal were constitutionally flawed in some
procedural sense, nor that his counsel was incompetent, but simply
that he is innocent-that the system got his case wrong. Under
Jackson v Virginia, the defendant is entitled to relief if the habeas
court finds that no rational jury could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt."3 5 While this standard sounds hard to meet in
the abstract, in practice it is even harder: simple insufficiency-of-
the-evidence relief on federal habeas is almost unheard of.
If our argument about defaulted claims is right, then the in-
sufficient evidence claim should receive a more favorable hearing.
The defendant's claim of injustice is essentially the same in both
situations. And, one might contend, there is no obvious reason to
grant relief to arguably innocent defendants who happen to have
constitutional claims, but to deny relief to arguably innocent de-
fendants who are victims of factfinder error. An innocence-
protective law for defaulted claims, such as our proposal, seems to
I" This hypothetical is derived from Carrier, 477 US 478. We have added the addi-
tional facts (which may or may not have been true in Carrier) that the undisclosed evidence
was exculpatory in suggesting a misidentification, and that nondisclosure thus prejudiced
the defendant.
135 443 US 307 (1979).
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lead logically to the position that habeas courts should regularly
and strictly review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting state
convictions. If this conclusion is accurate, our argument has more
radical implications for habeas corpus than we have acknowledged.
This point is at least partly true. It is wrong to worry a great
deal about protecting innocence in the first hypothetical, but not
at all in the second. To that extent, our argument does imply that
habeas courts should take seriously (more so than they probably
now do) claims of insufficient evidence. But Jackson suggests as
much. The rarity with which such claims are granted in federal
habeas may indicate that current practice is not consonant with
Jackson's promise. This may be because habeas doctrine concen-
trates on purely procedural issues-issues that may have the effect
of drowning out less "legal" claims that go directly to the justice of
the defendant's conviction. If so, reforming the law of defaulted
claims along the lines we have suggested would facilitate more seri-
ous review of Jackson claims by simplifying the process of getting
to the merits.
Having said that, we also think that habeas courts should un-
dertake sufficiency-of-the-evidence review in a very deferential
manner. This position is not at odds with a less deferential
prejudice standard for defaulted claims. Sufficiency-of-the-
evidence review simply allows another decisionmaker to second-
guess the conclusion reached earlier on the same facts. In deciding
what standard to apply to such claims, there is no good reason to
prefer the bottom-line judgment of the second decisionmaker to
that of the first, given a constant record. Indeed, the opposite is
true. The jury that heard the case, complete with live testimony,
was in a better position to assess the evidence than subsequent
decisionmakers. The jury's judgment should be accorded substan-
tial deference, particularly when state appellate courts have af-
firmed that judgment.
The analysis changes when a constitutional claim (other than
the Jackson insufficiency claim) is involved. Deference to the
factfinder should recede when the jury's judgment was based on an
incomplete record, as when the prosecution failed to disclose excul-
patory evidence prior to trial. Deference is also less appropriate in
cases like Teague, where the jury was selected in a manner that
might bias it in the government's favor. These examples show that
the presence or absence of a defaulted constitutional claim may
not be irrelevant to the defendant's claim of innocence, but instead
is sometimes a strong piece of evidence supporting that claim. At
least that is so when the constitutional claim in some way suggests
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that the outcome was unjust. The presence of a constitutional issue
should therefore be a significant factor-albeit not an essential
one-in evaluating the defendant's, claim of innocence.
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine that governs disposition of defaulted claims on
federal habeas corpus is needlessly complex, and does not clearly
serve any sensible policy of collateral review. We have argued for
two complementary reforms. First, the concept of "prejudice,"
under both Wainwright v Sykes and Strickland v Washington,
should be narrowed to include only outcome effects that create a
"reasonable possibility" of factually erroneous conviction (or sen-
tence of death). Second, the Sykes requirement of "cause" for pro-
cedural default and the analogous and intersecting Strickland re-
quirement that attorney error reflect incompetence should be
ignored. When a default raises a "reasonable possibility" of unjust
outcome, relief should be granted without regard to the "cause" or
competence categorization of the error. This approach would allow
courts to grant relief where it is most justified and deny relief
where it is not warranted. Equally important, it would foster sim-
plicity and rationality, qualities sorely lacking in the current law.
The temptation at this point is to suggest that our argument
implies a much broader and deeper reform of habeas law, going far
beyond the law of defaulted claims. We might find such a reform
congenial. But defaulted claim cases raise unique problems, and
the analysis of such claims may not be transferable to other con-
texts. Because defaulted claims arise infrequently and unpredict-
ably, the deterrence argument for relief in such cases is weak. That
may not be true for non-defaulted claims. Similarly, because the
list of potential defaulted claims in any one case is small or nonex-
istent (and usually consists of non-guilt-related claims), applying a
unitary prejudice standard such as the one we propose should
prove workable. That may not be so for other ineffective assistance
claims, where the list of potential attorney "errors" in any given
case is very long indeed.
Thus, the reform we urge is not especially far-reaching. It is an
effort to rectify a fairly small problem of habeas administration
that has received far more judicial time and energy than it de-
serves, in the process generating noticeably inequitable results.
This may be one of those rare opportunities to improve the caliber
of justice offered by our system, without the heavy adjudication
costs such improvements usually entail. If so, it is an opportunity
that our criminal justice system can hardly afford to abandon.
